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THE TRAUMATIC DIMENSION IN LAW 
David Gray Carlson* 
Legal knowledge can only be expressed in the future anterior tense. 
This concept is familiar enough to lawyers when the circuits are badly 
split and the Supreme Court seeks to cure the split by granting 
certiorari Under these conditions, no one is sure what the law is today, 
but later, when the Supreme Court resolves the split, we will have 
known what the law was all along. . 
This undeniable legal experience of the future anterior tense is n 
the exception—it is the very condition of possibi ity f®'" all ^ 
reasoning. Law is not sometimes, but always, spoken m the fotu 
anterior tense. The split in the circuits is always already resolved by 
a n  a n t e c e d e n t  l a w  w h o s e  r e v e l a t i o n  i s  a l w a y s  d e f e r r e d .  •  r - ^  
The purpose of this essay is to describe legal reasoning m futare 
anterior terms. In this account, future anteriority is the point at which 
legal reasoning coincides with the judicial opinion. This is the very 
point where we can find that law does determine the outcome of 
htigahon^^ opinion, whether by judge or lawyer, is what 
psychoanalysis refers to as an "act." The act, it seems, is always 
beyond the law. Paradoxically, law makes its appearance only throng 
the medium of the act. Only when the judge exceeds the law and 
disrupts it by acting will we know what the law is. „ 
In psychoanalysis, with its emphasis on unconscious motivation, 
an act precedes its reason-the effect precedes its cause. Only m after-
the-f(act) narration—i.e., the written opinion of the judge-^oes reason 
nrecede the act. Nevertheless, the act is a "real event. It is pre-
symbolic and, for that very reason, open to a posteriori narration, m 
which the judge claims that the act was "caused" by law. 
Acts are "traumatic." A trauma is a "residual experience that has 
* Professor of Law, Betrjamin N. Cardozo School f Law Yeshiva Lniversi^ Jo 
toZ Washington University School of Law and the University of Miami School of Law. 
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become a stumbling block to the patient."^ It is "that which interrupts 
the smooth functioning of law and the automatic unfolding of the 
signifying chain."^ It is "the rupture in the symbolic narrative 
continuum."^ It is "the object that cannot be swallowed, as it were, 
which remains stuck in the gullet of the signifier."^ It disrupts and 
continues to disrupt, until it is gentrified into the symbolic order. This 
gentrification is what psychoanalysis refers to as "cure" and what 
lawyers call legal reasoning. 
In law, every judicial decision is traumatic. A posteriori legal 
reasoning is the cure. It gentrifies the trauma by providing causal 
narrative after the fact for the judge's fundamentally spontaneous, free 
act. But from the premise that acts are always pre-rational the reader 
should not think that she is in for yet another rehearsal of bad legal 
realism, according to which will displaces law, and words mean 
whatever the judge wants them to mean. Legal realism holds that cases 
are decided pathologically—^by what the judge had for breakfast. Legal 
reasoning is portrayed as just a mask for power. Law is reduced to mere 
politics. 
This "Foucaultian" position^ is precisely the opposite of what 
psychoanalysis makes of legal reasoning. Lacanian theory^ explains 
legal reasoning's true and vital role in legal (and other) decisionmaking. 
The point here is absolutely not that legal decisionmaking is just 
politics. Judicial decisionmaking could not escape legality even if it 
made a concerted effort to do so. To turn the tables on Critical Legal 
Studies, politics is always a continuation of law by other means.'' Only 
in romantic jurisprudence (of which the legal academic left is usually 
guilty) can we dispense with reasoned law.^ The point of this essay, 
then, is to vindicate not just the possibility but the very necessity of 
good old-fashioned legal reasoning. Its intent is therefore 
fundamentally conservative. But, unlike other conservative accounts, 
which fear and therefore deny the Freudian unconscious, this account 
1 BRUCE FINK, THE LACANIAN SUBJECT: BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND JOUISSANCE 26 
(1995). 
2 Id. at 83. 
3 SLAVOJZIZEK, ON BELIEF 101 (2001). 
4 JACQUES LACAN, THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 270 
(Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Alan Sheridan trans., 1977). 
3 On the Foucaultian, or "historicist," position, see JOAN COPJEC, READ MY DESIRE: LACAN 
AGAINST THE HISTORICISTS 1-14 (1994) [hereinafter CoPJEC, READ MY DESIRE]. 
^ For a biographical sketch of Jacques Marie Emile Lacan, see YANNIS STAVRAKAKIS, 
LACAN AND THE POLITICAL 10-12 (1999). 
2 Cf. Pierre Schlag, Law as the Continuation of God by Other Means, 85 CAL. L. REV. 427 
(1997). 
® On the covert tendency for romanticism in leftist American scholarship, see David Gray 
Carlson, Review Essay, Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 
(1999); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora: The Ambiguity of Gifts, 46 UCLA L. REV. 815 
(1999). 
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embraces it as the very place where a judicial act coincides with the 
legal reasoning that caused it. In this vision, the subject is not pre-legal, 
as policy scientists hope. Nor is the subject entirely the product of the 
legal regime, as the Foucaultians would have it. Rather, the subject s 
existence is in the future anterior tense. It is what it will have done. Its 
presence is always a deferral. 
This Article exploits the psychoanalytic insight that all acts are 
traumatic (including the act of forming a legal opinion). In the act is the 
past, future, and present of the relation between law and outcome. First, 
law is in the past. In the judge's account of her opinion, the judge read 
the law and then followed it, producing the judicial outcome. Second, 
law comes too late; it is always deferred into the future. Legal 
reasoning is epiphenomenal to the act, and legal reasoning is 
epiphenomenal to the judicial decision. The act causes reason, and not 
reason the act. This is not just occasionally so. It is always so, on the 
view that the free act is spontaneous and uncaused.^ Third, and most 
important for our present purpose, law is present—i.e., coterminous 
with the judicial outcome. Given that acts are spontaneous {i.e., 
uncaused), we can see infinite causes of an act and hence never all of 
them. Acts are always over-determined."' This opacity of the agent s 
motivation—our inability to fathom our own motives is precisely 
what it means for human beings to be free (i.e., not "caused")." We are 
accorded the privilege of assigning meaning to our own acts (selected 
from an infinite set of possible causes).It is paradoxically this very 
over-determination (or freedom from reason) that permits the possibility 
that post hoc justification accurately describes the judicial decision. In 
the end, our freedom from reason underwrites the possibility of our free 
submission to reason. This third point therefore establishes the 
possibility that legal reasoning is the noble enterprise the pre-realists 
thought it was. 
I begin with some psychoanalytic information about the subject 
and her act. Thereafter, I discuss the Freudian superego and its impact 
9 "Spontaneity" is a Kantian term associated with freedom vs. self-causation. See 
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 33 (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans., 1990) (liberty is 
absolute spontaneity, an unconditioned as first member of a causal series) [hereinafter CRITIQUE 
QF PURE REASON]. „ 
10 See IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF MERE REASON AND 
OTHER WRITINGS 121 (Allen Wood & George di Giovanni trans., 1998) [hereinafter KANT, 
RELIGION]. 
11 See SLA vol ZIZEK, DID SOMEBODY SAY TOTALITARIANISM? FIVE INTERVENTIONS IN THE 
(MIS)USE OF A NOTION 58 (2001) ("Freedom is ultimately nothing but the space opened up by the 
traumatic encounter, the space to be filled in by its contingent/inadequate 
symbolizations/translations") [hereinafter ZIZEK, TOTALITARIANISM]. 
12 G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 114 Addition (Allen w. 
Wood ed., H.B. Nisbe't trans., 1991) ("it is the right of the moral will to recognize .. . only what 
was inwardly present as purpose") [hereinafter HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT]. 
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on interpretation. I will make the surprising claim that the superego 
coincides precisely with the legal regime in which law precedes the 
act—the regime where "right" legal answers are possible. The "right" 
legal answer is "Guilty!" 
Legal reasoning will then be described as narration in response to 
the trauma of legal decisionmaking. Various asides will be made at the 
expense of H.L.A. Hart and of what falsely passes as philosophy under 
the name of "pragmatism." Finally, the future anterior quality of law 
will be used to describe the content of that elusive concept—justice. 
The point of this essay is to account for the possibility of legal 
reasoning. Its intent is therefore fundamentally conservative and 
vindicative of the traditional legal enterprise. But, unlike other 
accounts, which deny the Freudian unconscious, this account embraces 
the unconscious and makes it the very place where a judicial act 
coincides with the legal reasoning that caused it. In this vision, the 
subject is not pre-legal, as the social policy scientists hope. Nor is the 
subject entirely the product of the legal regime, as the Foucaultians 
would have it. Rather, the subject is in the future anterior tense. It is 
what it will have done. Its presence is always a deferral. In short, the 
subject is the law, and the law is our freedom. 
THE SUBJECT 
What is the operative psychological theory in the ordinary science 
of legal scholarship, whether it be utilitarian, communitarian or 
libertarian in its outlook? It is undoubtedly this: law is "positive"—a 
fiction imposed by human beings on other human beings—^but the 
subject is "natural."'^ The subject is self-identical, self-present, and, 
above all, rational. This rational subject knows himself completely. In 
Lacanian terms, this subject "has the phallus."'^ There is no 
unconscious in this self-present entity. In effect, the subject coincides 
with the ego.'^ 
Psychoanalysis disagrees with this presupposition of self-identity 
13 STAVRAKAKIS, supra note 6, at 17. There is of course a natural law tradition but, of late, 
overt naturalism is scandalous and has become a priori grounds to disqualify its practitioners 
from nomination to the Supreme Court. See Lawrence Tribe, The Case Judge Thomas Shouldn't 
Have Heard: Natural Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1991. Paradoxically, natural psychology is 
accepted as a matter of course by run-of-the-mill legal scholarship, even while natural law is 
scorned as naive. 
14 See JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, LAGAN, 
PROPERTY, AND THE FEMININE 87-94 (1998). The masculine position of having implies a 
complete self-identity and a denial of castration. The feminine position, in contrast, is being. 
Woman is the phallus. See id. at 89. 
13 See generally David Gray Carlson, Jurisprudence and Personality in the Work of John 
Rawls, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1828 (1994). 
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and the implicit renunciation of the unconscious. In the Lacanian 
tradition, the subject is not self-identical. Indeed, [t]he subject who 
coincides entirely with herself is not yet a subject, and once she 
becomes a subject she no longer coincides with herself. ... 
Unlike the self-identical subject of utilitarianism and other forms 
of "common sense,"'^ the psychoanalytic subject is split between the 
Symbolic and the Real. It participates in the symbolic order. This is the 
public realm of language, law and ethics. The Symbolic is the realm of 
positive being—of concepts and thought. This is where the Ego thinks 
it resides in its self-identity. 
Lacanians deny that the symbolic "I" is the subject.'^ Rather, the 
subject is constituted by a negative something that language, reason and 
law never can describe. Lacan called this negativity the Real the 
unfathomable limit that prevents the Particular from achieving identity 
with itself."'^ As limit, the Real is not beyond the Symbolic realm, for 
there is no such beyond.^" The Real inheres within the realm of the 
symbolic.2i jhe Real stands for the inability of the Symbolic realm to 
be fully present. It stands against the presupposition that any object-
including the subject—can be self-identical.When limit is imagined 
to be utterly external to a concept, we have the presupposition of self-
identity, not to mention the Kantian presupposition of a beyond 
impervious to thought. For the Lacanians, the subject is the limit and 
16 ALENKA ZUPANCIC, ETHICS OF THE REAL: KANT, LAGAN 143 (2000). 
11 For the view that utilitarian psychology is normative and aspirational rather than 
descriptive, see COPJEC, READ MY DESIRE, supra note 5, at 65-116. 
18 For this reason, Lacanians insists that "[t]he '1' is not the subject." Mladen Dolar, Cogito 
as the Subject of the Unconscious, in SIC 2; COGITO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS 12 (Slavoj ZIZEK 
ed., 1998). 
19 SLAVOJ ZI2EK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO: ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL 
FACTOR 105 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafer ZL2EK, ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL FACTOR]. 
20 That there is no beyond—(i.e., that it is appearance all the way down) ends up being the 
very punchline of Hegel's entire philosophy. As Hegel remarks in the Phenomenology, "behind 
the so-called curtain which is supposed to conceal the inner world, there is nothing to be seen 
unless we go behind it ourselves, as much in order that we may see, as that there may be 
something behind there which can be seen." G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT § 165 
(A V Miller trans., 1977) [hereinafter PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT]. See ROBERT B. PIPPIN, 
HEGEL'S IDEALISM: THE SATISFACTIONS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 206 (1989) ("the major point 
... is to argue that there is literally nothing 'beyond' or 'behind' or responsible for the human 
experience of the world of appearances, and certainly not an Absolute Spirit."); KENNETH R. 
WESTPHAL, HEGEL'S EPISTELOGICAL REALISM: A STUDY OF THE AIM AND METHOD OF 
HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 165 (1989) ("if Hegel's arguments in the consciousness 
section [of the Phenomenology] are successful, then the world has been found to be cognitively 
accessible; there isn't anything more to the world than what it manifests. ). 
21 See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of Law and Economics, 
112 HARV. L. REV. 483, 500 (1998). 
22 Hegel emphasizes that limit always inheres within—not outside of—finite concepts. See 
HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 117 (A.v. Miller trans., 1969) ("This limit is . . . the immanent 
determination of the something itself, which latter is thus the finite. ) [hereinafter SCIENCE OF 
LOGIC]. On Hegel's theory of limit, see David Gray Carlson, Hegel's Theory of Quality, 22 
CARDOZO L. REV. 425, 520-23 (2001). 
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not constituted within or inside of a limit. 
The real is connected with jouissance—the momentary sense a 
subjeet feels in complete, triumphant self-identity. In jouissance, all 
alienation and pain ends. ''Jouissance is proof of the subject's 
existence,"23 but it is also lethal. If the subject is the split between the 
symbolic and the real, the surrender of the Symbolic is the death of the 
subject—^pure psychosis. 
Because the real is the negation of the symbolic, it is pre-
ontologicap4 and pre-historical.25 Although the Lacanians tell a certain 
noospheric story about the emergence of the subject from nature,^^ it 
must be strictly understood that the symbolic and real do not antedate 
the subject. The symbolic and the real are equiprimordial—they come 
into existence only simultaneously with the subject. This must be so, as 
the subjeet is simply the split between the symbolic and the real. 
The subject always faces the risk of slipping away from the 
symbolic into the real. A final merger with the Real is "ceasing-to-
be"—negative becoming, or psychosis. The subject resists this descent 
into darkness by striving to recognize itself symbolically. To 
distinguish itself and thereby to stave off death, the subject must body 
forth and find its shape in the symbolic. There the subject finds the 
public materials out of which it can build a "fantasy"—^the narrative in 
which the subjeet has positive existence to others. The Imaginary is 
thus the third great realm in Lacan's empire, alongside the Real and the 
Symbolic. In the Imaginary, the subject constructs a story in which he 
is whole and integral. It is for this reason that fantasy is on the side of 
"reality" and against the real.^? "[WJhen the phantasmic frame 
disintegrates," Slavoj Zizek warns, "the subject undergoes a 'loss of 
reality' and starts to perceive reality as an 'unreal' nightmarish universe 
with no firm ontological foundation."2^ This loss of fantasy is 
psychosis.29 
Language and law provide a refuge against psychosis. Yet the 
materials found there are never adequate to the subject. If I am purely 
23 ZUPANCiC, supra note 16, at 30. 
24 See SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE TICKL'SH SUBJECT: THE ABSENT CENTRE OF POLITICAL 
ONTOLOGY 33, 42, 63, 65 (1999) [hereinafter ZLZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT], 
25 See DANIEL BERTHOLD-BOND, HEGEL'S THEORY OF MADNESS 29 (1995). 
26 See generally SLAVOJ ZlZEK, THE ABYSS OF FREEDOM / AGES OF THE WORLD (1997) 
[hereinafter ZlZEK, ABYSS OF FREEDOM], 
27 See SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY 43 (1989) [hereinafter ZI2EK, 
SUBLIME OBJECT], 
28 ZIZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 51. See ZIZEK, SUBLIME OBJECT supra note 
27, at 35 (suggesting that fantasy is the soul of paranoia), 
29 See FINK, supra note 1, at 45-46, According to Daniel Berthold-Bond, "the mad self does 
not seek td destroy its own desire, but to emancipate its desire from any pretense of finding unity 
with what lies outside it." BERTHOLD-BOND, supra note 25, at 82. In other words, madness is a 
defense against painful encounters with the symbolic realm, which only the Imaginary can 
mediate. 
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symbolic, I have no individuality whatever. Rather, I reduce myself to 
the point where I am just an object to others. Too much objectification 
is a bad thing—the indicium of hysteria.^o it is pornography as such. 
Hence, if I am to maintain my existence as a private individual, I must 
keep my distance from the symbolic. I cannot reveal all. Whatever 
words I use to describe myself, I somehow always leave something 
out.3i If I show too much, I become the mere object to X\iQjouissance of 
others.^2 
But neither must I do the opposite. I must not merge with the Real 
(the incest taboo). This is a retreat into psychosis. In the Real I am not 
merely unfree. I am dead. 
As I am literally the gap between the Symbolic (where the subject 
finds a positive existence) and the Real (which is beyond languageV^ I 
cannot surrender to either extreme. If this gap closes (in favor of either 
realm), I no longer exist as a subject. 
Yet, if I am a gap, I am a void—a nothing. I desire to "be," but I am 
not. To be fully something, a supplement is needed. This feeling 
that something is missing is the above-mentioned castration.^"* 
As a subject, I desire to close the gap by manucaption of my 
missing parts. Only in the resurrection of the body can I be whole. But 
if I succeed—if I establish a self-identity free and clear of the symbolic 
30 See SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER; AN ESSAY ON SCHELLING AND 
RELATED MATTERS 164 (1996) [hereinafter ZIZEK, INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER]; SLAVOJ ZIZEK, 
LOOKING AWRY: AN INTRODUCTION TO JACQUES LACAN THROUGH POPULAR CULTURE 131 
(1991) [hereinafter ZIZEK, LOOKING AWRY], . • 
31 Woman, for the Lacanians, is the "not-all" who does not submit to the phallic function ot 
complete knowledge. According to Collette Soler, "Man is the subject entirely submitted to the 
phallic function, from which it follows that castration is his lot Woman is the opposite, the 
Other who has not fully [pas tout] submitted to the reign of phallic puissance. . . Collette 
Soler, The Curse on Sex, in SEXUATION SiC 3 41 (Renata Salecl ed., 2000). 
32 This is, 1 think at the heart of feminist opposition to pomography. See COPJEC, READ MY 
DESIRE, supra note 5, at 35. Zizek insinuates that the superego is pomographic, since it sees all. 
See SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE PLAGUE OF FANTASIES 177-92 (1997) [hereinafter ZLZEK, PLAGUE OF 
FANTASIES] Our individuality, then, depends upon our refusal to give into this obscene demand 
to surrender our opacity. See id. at 114. More precisely, what we are ashamed to reveal are our 
fantasies, in which we see ourselves uncastrated. ZIZEK, SUBLIME OBJECT, supra note 27, at 74. 
33 See FiNK, supra note 1, at 45. 
34 Zizek describes eastration as follows: 
In short, by means of the Word, the subject finally finds himself, comes to himself: he 
is no longer a mere obscure longing for himself since, in the Word, he directly attains 
himself, posits himself as such. The price, however, is the irrefrievable loss of the 
subject's self-identity: the verbal sign that stands for the subject—in which the subject 
posits himself as self-identical—bears the mark of an irreducible dissonanee; it never 
"fits" the subject. This paradoxical necessity on account of which the act of retuming-
to-oneself, of finding oneself, immediately, in its very actualization, assumes the form 
of its opposite, of the radical loss of one's self-identity, displays the structure of what 
Lacan calls "symbolic castration." u 
ZIZEK, INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER, supra note 30, at 46-47. in other words, 1 obtain my being m 
the symbolic. Yet the symbolic is not me', 1 am alienated from my own being. 
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realm—I rejoin the Real. Therefore, I eannot succeed. Rather, I succeed 
only by failing. 
ACTS 
In the real, there is no time. As Kant emphasizes, time and space 
are precisely the attributes of the subject that can distinguish things. 
Yet, in every act, the subject gains a taste of the real. In the act is a 
glimpse of wholeness—^what Lacan called enjoyment. When I enjoy, I 
am fulfilled and feel whole. Time is suspended. Everything (and 
therefore nothing) is present. The gap between the symbolic and the 
real closes for an instant. 
Enjoyment is fleeting, however (though time flies when you are 
having fun). Enjoyment can never be "synchronized" with "the 
symbolic order.If enjoyment were perpetual, I would be dead. 1 
would have merged with the Real. Temporalization of experience will 
have ceased. The superego therefore enjoins, "Do not close the gap. 
Do not merge with the Real. You are castrated. Stay that way. In 
short, do not act." This is how Lacan interprets the Incest Taboo. 
Merging again with Mother is reinterpreted by Lacan to mean merging 
with the Real. Such an aspiration is lethal. Its prohibition is the very 
condition of the subject's continuance. 
Yet the subject, suspended between the Real and the Symbolic, 
desires to be whole. The act is designed to fulfill desire and procure 
enjoyment. The subject—a "faculty of desire"^'—cannot help but act— 
all the time. Every thought, every image generated in the brain is an 
act, aiming at self-wholeness. 
In order to enjoy, we must act. In the words of Georg Simmel, a 
tum-of-the-century sociologist: 
Human enjoyment of an object is a completely undivided act. At 
such moments we have an experience that does not include an 
awareness of an object confronting us or an awareness of the self as 
distinct from its present condition. Phenomena of the basest and the 
35 For Kant, time and space are pure a priori intuition. Time inheres not in the objects 
themselves, but solely in the subject which intuits them. See CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra 
note 9, at 33. In Hegelian terms, time is "pure freedom in face of an 'other.'" G.W.F. HEGEL, 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT § 679 (A.V. Miller trans., 1977) [hereinafter PHENOMENOLOGY OF 
SPIRIT]. The "other" may be translated here as the real, and also as the symbolic. Thus, spirit in 
its freedom appears only in time, but once it fully grasps what it is, it abolishes time. See id. § 
801. 
36 ZIZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 322. 
37 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 32 (T.K. Abbott trans., 1996) 
[hereinafter CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON]. 
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highest kind meet here.^® 
An "act" is some observable effect in the world, caused by a free human 
being.^' An act suspends the symbolic and ethical truth and hence 
violates it."*® Acts are thus traumatic."*' They disturb the underlying 
fantasy of the audience."'^ The audience that observes the act must now 
reconstruct the disrupted symbolic order in light of what it has 
witnessed. In short, the act must be interpreted. Through interpretation, 
the symbolic order is reconstituted in light of the act. 
Transposed to law, we can say that acts are never lawful. As Zizek 
has put it: "from the perspective of the existing positive Laws of a 
symbolic community, an act appears by definition as Crime, since it 
violates its symbolic limits and introduces an unheard-of element which 
turns everything topsy-turvy.""'^ 
Such a conclusion may seem shocking at first. Surely not every act 
is a crime."'"' Iff decide to buy a carton of milk and iff tender the asked-
for price and take the milk home, have I committed a crime? The 
answer is yes, on a certain psychoanalytic definition of law: the law of 
the superego. This definition will appear extraordinary, but the 
definition simply takes to its logical conclusion a feature of which 
American jurisprudence is very fond indeed—right answers. 
THE PATERNAL SUPEREGO 
The element of law that the superego exploits to the hilt is the 
requirement that action is to be judged according to pre-existing rules. 
Ex post facto law does not even deserve the name "law.""'^ It is tyranny 
38 GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY 65 (David Frisby ed., Tom Bottomore & 
David Frisby trans., 2d ed. 1990). 
39 How do we know that there is such a thing as a free human being? Kant, the philosopher 
of freedom par excellence, was not entirely sure. He could only "postulate" that it existed. That 
is, no one can prove it does not exist and, therefore, we are licensed to believe in it (along with 
God and immortality of the soul). See HENRY E. ALLISON, KANT'S THEORY OF FREEDOM 230-
38 (1990). On the role of postulation in Kant's thought, see GILLIAN ROSE, HEGEL CONTRA 
SOCIOLOGY 95-97 (1981). 
40 See ZI2EK, LOOKING AWRY, supra note 30, at 140; illEK, TOTALITARIANISM, supra note 
9, at 161. 
41 See SLAVOJ 2I2EK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE: KANT, HEGEL, AND THE CRITIQUE 
OF IDEOLOGY 89 (1993) [hereinafter 2IZEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE]. 
42 See ZI2EK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 200. 
43 ZI2EK. ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL FACTOR, supra note 19, at 192. 
44 Even the normally intrepid Ziiek shies away from this conclusion and aims at a distinction 
between speech acts (which are sustained by a fantasy built from symbolic materials) and other 
acts (which are ethical because they exceed the symbolic law). See 2I2EK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, 
supra note 24, at 374-77; ZIZEK, TOTALITARIANISM, supra note 11, at 173. This distinction must 
be renounced. Every act—speech acts and even thoughts—are subject to same dynamic of action 
being described here. 
45 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 85 (1986). 
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as such.''^ Hence, first there must be a law. Then the act. The act will 
be judged according to this pre-existent law. 
The Superego rests upon this ordinary conservative notion. When 
conservatives defend law, they usually insist that it is possible (at least 
some of the time) for law to constrain judges. Indeed, it is a 
conservative commonplace that judges should follow, andbot make, the 
law. All psychoanalysis does is to take that notion very, very seriously. 
It is said that the surest way to subvert a philosophical system is to 
take it too seriously—^to be over-orthodox, to show the secret cards of 
ideology.''^ Accordingly, we take to its extreme the principle that law 
must precede action. We will be more Bork than Bork. Under this 
principle, law is always perfectly certain and determinate. Right legal 
answers exist. These are high virtues in right-wing jurisprudence, and 
psychoanalysis adopts this view with a vengeance. 
Prohibition and permission must exist in a strict correlation with 
each other, if there are to be right answers. An act is either permitted or 
prohibited. There can be no penumbra in which acts may or may not be 
legal. Correlation is the key to jurisprudence itself. In a pathbreaking 
work, Arthur Jacobson identifies five possible jurisprudences: Initially 
we have (1) positive and (2) natural law. These are the correlative 
jurisprudences. In these jurisprudences the legal field is completely 
full, and right answers always exist (if only they could be found). The 
other three are dynamic in nature. The dynamic legal universe is not 
full but in the process of filling. The dynamic possibilities are (3) the 
jurisprudence of right (Hegel), (4) jurisprudence of duty (Kant), and (5) 
the jurisprudence of performativity (Anglo-American common law).''^ 
Ultimately, the last position—^performativity—will be the Lacanian 
position.'^^ For now, we focus on the correlative jurisprudences— 
positive and natural law. These systems (taken seriously) guarantee a 
right answer. Whether law is "posited" by mere human beings or by 
nature/God does not matter here. The dispute between positivists and 
naturalists is a dispute about mere origin. Wherever law comes from, 
we insist only that it fill the field completely. This law has no gaps. 
There is always a right answer. 
Outside of Dworkin, who courageously takes this position,few 
Oddly, this is precisely the Lacanian view of the law of the superego. See infra text 
accompanying notes 72-94. 
47 See Slavoj Zizek, Why Does the Law Need an Obscene Supplement?, in LAW AND THE 
POSTMODERN MIND; ESSAYS ON PSYCHANALYSIS AND JURISPRUDENCE 75, 89 (Peter Goodrich 
& David Gray Carlson eds., 1998) [hereinafter Ziiek, Obscene Supplement^. 
48 See Arthur J. Jacobson, Hegel's Legal Plenum, in HEGEL AND LEGAL THEORY 97 (Drucilla 
Cornell et al. eds., 1991). 
49 See infra text accompanying notes 115-53. 
50 See DWORKIN, supra note 45, at 412; RONALD DwORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 144-
45 (1985). 
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would acknowledge the existence of brutally correlative law. Even 
conservative lawyers, consulting their experience, would say that the 
law includes unruly cases of first impression, which are ungovemed by 
pre-existing law. On this view, there are gaps in the law that must be 
filled in. There is room for the law to grow. 
Any such concession, however, is a betrayal of conservative 
principle. Conservatives may object at this point that no empirical 
conservative (outside of Dworkin) believes the law is completely 
present; what 1 describe is merely an ideal type of no descriptive worth. 
To this claim, I respond that such a reaction only signals a profound fear 
of confi-onting the true implication of conservative belief. The dearth of 
empirical instances is of no matter, if conservatism as such is implicated 
in the ideal type. All psychoanalysis does is to adhere to the stringent 
requirement that law must precede action—the very foundation of 
conservative jurisprudence. That empirical conservatives have no 
courage of their convictions cannot serve to refute what follows. 
Therefore, on ordinary tort law principles,^' conservatives are absolutely 
responsible for the consequences of what I am about to explain. The 
authentic conservative is "not afraid to pass to the act, to assume all the 
consequences ... 
What I now would like to suggest is that correlative jurisprudence 
(where law always precedes the act) has a precise psychoanalytic 
interpretation: it is the Freudian superego. The superego is absolute 
perfect knowledge of pre-existing law. Proof of this proposition is an 
important task of this Article. That proof will be coming in due 
course. 
Meanwhile, 1 have said that, for the superego, there is always a 
right answer, per Dworkin. I now wish to go Dworkin one better and 
suggest there is only one right answer: if you act, you are guilty. A law 
that always precedes action has the effect of abolishing all action— 
unless an act is a perfect repetition of some earlier act we know to be 
legal. According to this Prussian, superegoic definition of law, 
originality and spontaneity—freedom itself—are banished, because 
freedom produces acts which are never vouchsafed by pre-existing 
law.^"* In Joan Copjec's words, "The phenomenon of guilt is our proof 
51 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (stating that an act is intentional when "the 
actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are 
substantially certain to result from it"). 
53 ZlZEK, supra note 3, at 4. 
53 See infra. 
54 This is Kant's position: 
Now, moral evil. . . brings with it an infinity of violations of the law, and hence an 
infinity of guilt... not so much because of the infinity of the highest lawgiver whose 
authority is thereby offended ... but because the evil is in the disposition . . . 
KANT, RELIGION, supra note 10, at 89. See Joan Copjec, Introduction: Evil in the Time of the 
Finite World, in RADICAL EVIL xiv (Joan Copjec ed., 1996) ("Common to Freud and Kant is the 
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that the subject is free, that it exceeds the historical content in which 
alone it realizes itself. 
The free act is original and spontaneous. If perfect repetition were 
possible, legality would likewise be possible. Perfect repetition was 
possible in the Garden of Eden, until Eve ate of the tree of Imowledge.^^ 
Since then, repetition has been ruled out. Nowadays, sin is strictly 
original. And what is sin? Precisely the jouissance of the act, in which 
the bounds of the Symbolic realm are transcended.^^ 
It is because of freedom's jouissance that all actions are 
condemned by superegoic law. In every act, there is at least one 
original element—its authorship by a unique individual. The freedom 
of the individual to act is a radically incommensurate element always 
infused into the act itself. This element guarantees that no act can be 
underwritten in advance by the law. Quite the opposite is true. All acts 
are by definition creative and hence condemned. 
Radical freedom, then, is a noumenal concept postulated as 
unexpected assertion not only that moral conscience is always certain, but that it is, moreover, 
eertain of only one thing: its guilt."). It is also Hegel's position. See PHENOMENOLOGY OF 
SPIRIT, supra note 35, §§ 398-400. Thus, Hegel describes the act as the "original determinacy" 
and the birth of individuality: "action is itself nothing else but negativity." Id. § 399. 
COPJEC, READ MY DESIRE, supra note 5, at xvi. The universality of guilt also implies that 
guilt is not a moral term but, instead, an ontological one. See BERTHOLD-BOND, supra note 25, at 
171. 
56 Augustine suggests that paradise is the union of jouissance and knowledge. AUGUSTINE, 
THE CITY OF GOD 457-75 (Mareus Dods trans., 1950). That is to say, when Adam and Eve acted 
(i.e., engaged in sexual intercourse), they did not lose themselves or blank out. In effect, the 
omnipresence of knowledge, even during the act, meant that Adam and Eve were "perfectly" 
rational. They had no hidden uneonsciousness. They had perfeet control over their bodies. They 
could therefore be sure that their aets were lawful and fully vouchsafed by pre-existent law—i.e., 
perfectly repetitive. See Miran Bozovic, Malebranche 's Occasionalism, or, Philosophy in the 
Garden of Eden, in SiC 2: COGITO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS 148, 157-63 (Slavoj tizek ed., 1998); 
SCHROEDER, supra note 14, at 90. This is the eonceit of sexual perversion: "the fundamental 
illusion of the pervert is that he possesses a (symbolic) knowledge that enables him to regulate his 
access to jouissance." ZLZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 322. 
57 According to Miran BozoviC: 
What was it that Adam did? Or, more precisely, what was it that he did not do? ... 
What Adam did not do was to make use of the power he had over his body: upon 
joining himself to . . . "the forbidden fruit," Adam did not suppress the sensation of 
pleasure that God was producing in his mind, but rather, abandoned himself to it. And 
it was precisely by not renouncing the pleasure immediately after it fulfilled its 
advisory function, that Adam crossed the line between innocence and sin... . Adam 
allowed his mind's capacity to be exhausted by the sensation of pleasure, to the extent 
that the darkness . . . obscured the light of reason. Having thus been distracted, Adam 
never regained his mind's attention. What the sensation of pleasure, which Adam was 
unwilling to renounce, erased from his mind, was the mind's "clear perception, which 
informed him that God was his good, the sole cause of his pleasures and joy, and that 
he was to love only Him."... It was, therefore, nothing less than the very truth of 
occasionalism [i.e., the position that God is the only cause of things] that was erased 
from Adam's mind. And therein lies Adam's sin. 
Bozovic, supra note 56, at 163 (intemal citation omitted). 
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existing separate and apart from the chain of causal being.^^ Only 
conscious, speaking human beings are free and hence guilty in the all-
seeing eye of superegoic law. Animals—or psychotic human beings— 
are acquitted because they lack this freedom. Animals and psychotics 
conform to the law precisely because they are incapable of acting. The 
proper act is an act of freedom—inherently illegal and beyond the 
bounds of the symbolic order. Nothing done by a free individual can 
live up to the demands of superegoic law, which despises (but requires) 
freedom itself. 
I have said that law as experienced even by conservative lawyers 
has gaps in it. But the law in which there are always right answers is 
the Freudian superego.^^ What this implies is that there is no distinction 
between positive and natural law. Positivists claim that law and 
morality are not necessarily connected.^" What they do not grasp is that 
positive law and morality are the same thing, so long as one insists that 
law always precedes human action and there are right legal answers. 
One must, however, distinguish between external social regulation (law 
experienced as full of gaps) and internal moral law (which has no gaps). 
The difference between these two laws is the difference between reality 
and the Real.^' Conservatives who admit there are not always right 
answers are talking about social reality. But the realm in which right 
answers are guaranteed is where the superego emerges to condemn all 
acts. This Real moment, as we shall see, is the traumatic dimension in 
law.®2 
HART 
Superegoic law admits to no gaps. Its perfection consists precisely 
of its opposition to all action. But no living legal theorist will admit that 
superegoic law is in effect in society. The vision is simply too extreme. 
It violates the experience that all lawyers attest to—there is not always a 
58 See CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 37, at 32 (causality not determinable by 
physical laws); CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 9, at 33 (liberty is absolute spontaneity, 
an unconditioned as first member of a causal series); id. at 300 (the causality of freedom is not 
subordinated to another cause determining it in time; freedom is not given in experience and is 
independent of impulse). 
59 See Alenka ZupanCifi, The Subject of the Law, in SiC 2: COGITO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS 
41, 41 (Slavoj 2i2ek ed., 1998) (stating that "what philosophy calls the moral law and, more 
precisely, what Kant calls the categorical imperative, is in fact nothing other than the superego"). 
50 See ANOTHY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 272, 314-15 
(1998). 
5' See hiEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 132. On the role of social regulation as 
relieving the unbearable pressure of the superego, see Jeatme L. Schroeder & David Gray 
Carlson, Review Essay, Kenneth Starr: Diabolically Evil?, 88 CAL. L. REV. 653 (2000). 
52 See hiEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 280. 
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correct legal answer. 
Still, only bad legal realism goes to the other extreme by denying 
the existence of any right answer. Empirically, most Anglo-American 
legal theorists are in the middle. They think that there are usually right 
answers, although sometimes the law is unclear. In other words, law 
mostly but not always precedes action. 
Such a vision most famously can be found in the work of H.L.A. 
Hart.^3 In an approach that aims to be "descriptive," rather than 
"conceptual,"64 Hart supposedly accounts for uncertainty in the law. He 
emphasized that law was mostly determinate.^^ At such moments, law 
had a certain, eore meaning.66 core is where judges have irnmediate 
knowledge.67 Here is where legal phenomenon perfectly coincides with 
legal noumenon.6^ 
Sometimes, however. Hart claimed that no right answer precedes 
the case. These cases are located in law's penumbra, where the judge 
has discretion to make new law—i.e., legislate.^^ Thus, Hart attempted 
to account for the uncanny feeling that all lawyers have ^there is no 
clear answer out there, at least some of the time.^ Because this 
experience is proclaimed (though never proven) to be "penumbral," the 
Rule of Law is preserved. 
Paradoxically, in spite of his emphasis on law's "'open texture. 
Hart nevertheless subscribes fully to superegoic law—law with no gaps, 
law in which there are only unique right answers. Hart tries to account 
for legal uncertainty, but he never abandons the premise of correlative 
superegoic law. In Hart's thought—and contrary to psychoanalytic 
theory—^these gaps are determinate gaps. If law has gaps in it, then 
there must be a law of the gap. We must know in advance which acts 
are in the core and which acts are in the penumbra. But to really know 
an act is to know everything about an act—^to know its complete 
context. This is radical knowledge indeed—superegoic knowledge. 
Once the act's complete context is known, we certainly know whether 
the act is in the core or in the penumbra. Hence, law knows precisely 
5EE EENERA/FY H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). , N J- I T! F 
64 And this in spite of the title of Hart's book. See Gerald P. Moran, A Radical Theory of 
Jurisprudence: The "Decisionmaker" as the Source of Law-The Ohio ^ 
Adoption of the Spendthrift Trust Doctrine as a Model, 30 AKRON L. REV. 393^1 (199 ). 
65 HART, supra note 63, at 148 ("overwhelming majonty of cases ). This is, ot course, 
asserted and not proved. j -71 
66 Id. at 121-32. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 
HARV.L. REV. 593, 607 (1958). ron.T, RPV 781 802 
67 See Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 80 
(1988). 
68 A Hegelian coincidence that I will very much defend later on. 
69 "If a penumbra of uncertainty must surround all legal rules, then their application to 
specific cases in the penumbral area cannot be a matter of logical deduction." Hart, supra note 
66, at 607. 
70 HART, supra note 63, at 133. 
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where the boundary is between core and penumbra, and it toows 
precisely where any given act is to be located. Even when an act falls in 
the penumbra, it is fully regulated in advance. The law of the penumbra 
is simply that the actor is subjected to the caprice of the judge. e 
superegoic "correlative" aspect of law is therefore at the core of 
Hart's positivist jurisprudence.''' . 
Under our extreme version of positive law {i.e., positive law taken 
seriously), whether we apply Hart's innovation or not, fuU law precedes 
every act. The law is completely determinate (even if it determines 
certain acts to be in the penumbra where judges are invited to enjojO. 
Every act  that  has ever been performed has already been judged. The 
number of permitted acts is strictly finite. Hence, the only acts 
permitted by such a law are pure repetitions—mechanical acts. 
Creativity is unlawful. Yet no act is repetitive, because it is always 
authored by a spontaneous free individual. In short, all acts are cnmes. 
THE MATERNAL SUPEREGO 
No matter what we do, we fail to live up to the law of the superep. 
More familiarly, it is impossible to please our parents or God O-^-^yhat 
Lacan calls the big Other).'^ Nothing is good enough for this big Other 
We are condemned in advance. As Hegel emphasized, innocence y jus 
a name for non-action. Action as such is guilt.'^ This explains why we 
feel so guilty all the time-why "[o]ur guilt is all we know of the 
law."'''' Hegel puts it this way: 
No man is a hero to his valet; not, however, because the man is not a 
hero, but because the valet—is a valet, whose dealings are with the 
man, not as a hero, but as one who eats, drinks, and wears clothes, in 
general, with his individual wants and fancies. Thus, for the judging 
consciousness, there is no action in which it could not oppose to the 
universal aspect of the action, the personal aspect of he 
individuality, and play the part of the moral valet towards the 
so, at 139, .52; SrAVOl Z12BK, THB MHTASTASHS 
OF ENJOYMBNT: SIX ESSAYS ON WOMAN AND CAUSALITY 42 (1994) [hereinafter ZLZBK, 
Hegel writes of consciousness splitting itself in two when it 
raises itseftto^actwiL^ specific quality of the ethical life, of being the simple certainty of 
immediate truth, and initiates the division of itself into itself as the active pnnciple ^ 
irthe reality over against it, a reality which, for it, is negative. By the deed, 
therefore, it becomes guilt. 
PHBNOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT, supra note 35, § 468. 
74 COPJEC, READ MY DESIRE, supra note 5, at xiv. 
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£i^cnt ^ 
In other words, because every act is individual the moral valet finds it 
wanting in purity. ^ ,. 
What we now have before us tout court is the Freudian superep. 
This "'severe master' of the ego"^^ is the part of personality that 
prohibits. It is quite totalitarian in its attitude." What does Ac 
superego prohibit? In Lacanian theory, it prohibits enjoyment. We 
enioy our own acts and for that reason we are condemned m advance if 
we act. We are always at war with our own superego when we act. 
Wholeness is what "acts" aim at. In action, the subject seeks to 
satisfy desire—to provoke a merger with the Real." If the subject is the 
gap between the Symbolic and the Real {i.e., a faculty of desire), the 
subject acts precisely to fill the gap. Yet this is what the superego 
prohibits. In action, the subject literally (but fleetingly) withdraws from 
the symbolic order entirely.It is for this reason that we can say that 
all action is prohibited. Action is incestuous, m the Lacanian sense. It 
is psyehoticsi and terroristie.^z We enjoy ourselves when we act, and 
this is precisely what is prohibited. 
The superego that prohibits is the paternal superego—the superego 
that knows and sees all.^^ It condemns everything. But what it 
condemns happens not to be possible. A merger wtth the real wou d 
constitute our obliteration. Hence, it is said, suicide is the o^ 
successful act. Only in suicide is the gap between the real and 
symbolic finally closed.^^ Any act short of this is doomed to fail. 
This leads to a strange inversion m the superego. The patema 
superego which deprives the subject of all enjoyment expropnates this 
surplus and uses it in aid of its perverse maternal sid^e. Thus, the 
superego (which prohibits) simultaneously says, "Go ahead and enjoy, 
you failure. Nothing will come of it."^^ The superego dares us to act. 
75 PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT, supra note 35, § 665 (footnote omitted). 
76 ZILEK, PLAGUE OF FANTASIES, supra note 32, at 171. 
II ffhowel^, we listen to the superego and fail to act, we suffer from ""^session " to. 
SUBLIME OBJECT, supra note 27, at 59, or "neuroses." ZTTEK, METASTASES OF ENJO 
'"^TsTAmEY R^EN, G.W.F. HEGEL: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF WISDOM 155 
(1974) ("The desire for satisfaction is a desire for complete self-consciousness. ). 
80 "In action," Hamlet says, "how like an angel! In apprehension, how like a god. WILLIA 
SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, Act II, Scene 2. 
81 See ZiiEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 60. 
82 See id. at 377-78. 
83 ZUPANCIC, supra note 16, at 147. 
84 7I2EK TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE, sitpra note 41, at 31. 
85 Ss i; emphasized by St. Paul in Romarrs 7:7. See also Romans 5:20 ("law came in, with 
the result that the trespass multiplied"). Rir 5- TooiTO AND THE 
86 See Renata Salecl, The Silence of the Feminine Jouissance, in SiC 2. COGITO AND THE 
UNCONSCIOUS 175, 189 (Slavoj Ziiek ed., 1998). 
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knowing that we cannot succeed. 
This second aspect of the superego is quite as necessary as the first. 
In the first aspect, the superego condemns all acts. Yet, if we took the 
superegoic program too seriously, the subject would do nothing. Such a 
subject would suffer from "obsessional neurosis"—^paralysis in the face 
of the big Other's disapproval.^^ The subject who takes the superego 
too seriously thus undermines the superegoic regime. A certain distance 
between the subject and the regime is needed, if the regime of the 
superego is to perform its function of condemnation. Law as such can 
never appear unless the subject acts. Without action, the superego 
would disappear. Therefore, the superego requires a carnival, or a 
Mardi Gras, during which the subject turns everything topsy-turvy and 
acts.8« Yet, ironically, when the subject acts, she disrupts the very 
superegoic regime that required the act. All acts are therefore "death" 
drives. This is why Zizek writes: "the very existence of subjectivity 
involves the 'false', 'abstract' choice of Evil, of Crime—that is, an 
excessive 'unilateral' gesture which throws the harmonious Order of the 
Whole out of balance."^® In effect, the law sacrifices itself in requiring 
the subject to act in contravention of law. It is therefore our grim duty 
to the law that we enjoy its transgression.^'' 
This maternal side of the superego, taken to its extreme, incites the 
subject to absolute rage and enjoyment, where everything is obliterated 
in Dionysian frenzy.^' Thanks to the maternal superego, we feel guilty 
when we do not enjoy.The superego condemns us both for acting and 
not acting. 
The fact that superegoic law requires the obscene enjoyment of the 
subject is precisely what must not be revealed. This is the prohibition 
against (but covert sponsorship of) pornography—i.e., reduction of the 
subject to an object for the enjoyment of the big Other. Should it be 
revealed that the superego depends on the act's obscenity, then the 
superegoic law's complicity in the very crimes it condemns would be 
exposed. 
87 See ZIZEK, METASTASES OF ENJOYMENT, supra note 72, at 13. 
88 See Zizek, Obscene Supplement, supra note 47, at 90-91. 
89 ZIZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 96.; See id. at 99,160. 
90 The Lacanians call this the "forced choice." On the necessity of this, see Schroeder & 
Carlson, supra note 61. 
91 See 2IZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 97, 126, 156. See also JUDITH BUTLER, 
THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER: THEORIES IN SUBJECTION 49 (1997) ("The repressive law is not 
external to the libido that it represses, but the repressive law represses to the extent that repression 
becomes a libidinal activity."). 
92 See ZIZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 160. This is the double guilt of the death 
of God. When God dies, it is upon us to enjoy and we cannot. See SLAVOJ ZIZEK, ENJOY YOUR 
SYMPTOM!: JACQUES LACAN IN HOLLYWOOD AND OUT 167 (1992) [hereinafter ZIZEK, ENJOY 
YOUR SYMPTOM]. Thus, Lacan turns Dostoevski around: If God does not exist, then nothing is 
permitted. See THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK 11, The Ego in Freud's Theory and in 
the Technique of Psychoanalysis 128 (1988). 
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Jeanne Schroeder beautifully describes the injunction of the 
superego to enjoy. The law must, on the one hand, deny its complicity 
in crime. On the other hand, the law will not function without feminine 
enjoyment—i.e., the act.^^ Accordingly, the "act" is the primordial 
crime and also the crime that is constantly with us. It is diabolical 
evil—a necessary obscene underside of superegoic law.^'' 
To summarize our progress so far, we took an aspect of law that 
everyone agrees is admirable. Law must precede action. The judge 
cannot simply make up the law on the spot, or what we have is tyranny, 
not law. Every conservative believes this—and suspects the Supreme 
Court tyrannizes us with made-up constitutional doctrines falsely 
attributed to the penumbra of the Constitutional text. We have taken 
this conservative belief and, and although it went hard on us, we have 
bettered the instruction. We have rendered this aspect of law truly 
extreme—well beyond that which the covert wimp Robert Bork would 
allow—and we have discovered that we have out lawed all human 
freedom—defined as the subject's spontaneity.Perfectly determinate 
law turned out to be the superego, which opposes the idea of action. 
But also, in its maternal phase, superegoic law requires action in order 
to perpetuate itself. 
CRIME 
I have suggested that every act is original. It exceeds the symbolic 
order of law. All action is therefore crime. But what is crime? 
A crime is that which denies universality to the symbolic order. 
Crime announces that law is not law. For Hegel, crime "constitutes a 
negatively infinite judgemenf"^^ (e-g-> "the rose is not an elephant"). As 
Hegel puts it: 
Crime may be quoted as an objective instance of the negatively 
infinite judgement. The person committing a crime . . . does not. . . 
merely deny the particular right of another person .... He denies the 
right of that person in general, and therefore he is not merely forced 
to restore what he has stolen, but is punished in addition, because he 
has violated law as law . .. .^^ 
93 See JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS: THE EROTICS OF THE MARKET 
(forthcoming). 
94 Diabolical evil is evil done for nonpathological reasons. It therefore meets Kant's 
categorical imperative and is therefore indistinguishable from morality. See generally Schroeder 
& Carlson, supra note 61. 
93 See CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 37, at 66; CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, 
supra note 9, at 87-88, 227, 230. 
96 HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY QF RIGHT, supra note 12, § 95. 
97 HEGEL'S LOGIC § 173 (William Wallace trans., 1975) (1873). On why crime is a negative 
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On this definition, all acts are crimes. When a subject acts, the 
symbolic order is denied all its force. Yet acts are likewise the very 
attribute of a free subject. We are free to act. Therefore, we may 
conclude that (superegoic) law is absolutely incompatible with human 
freedom. » 
Paradoxically, law itself must be legislated. In other words, tor 
there to be law, there must be a legislative "act." This means that 
positive law itself is a crime—t/ie primordial crime. It is the murder of 
Father Enjoyment and the institution of the Name-of-the-Father in his 
p l a c e . Y e t  p o s i t i v e  l a w  h a s  t h e  b a d  m a n n e r s  t o  d e n o u n c e  u s  f o r  our 
crimes. , 
The foundational violence of law has by now engendered an 
enormous philosophical literature.^^ Such literature must be understood 
precisely in the Lacanian sense of "act." Which is to say that law is not 
necessarily "violent" in the lay sense of the term. I n  legal circles, 
Robert Cover has made fashionable the notion that law is violent, but 
he usually does not refer to the speculative content of "law as act." 
Thus, he writes: 
Judges are people of violence. Because of the violence they 
command, judges characteristically do not create law, but kill it. 
Theirs is the jurispathic office. Confronting the luxuriant growth of 
a hundred legal traditions, they assert that this one is law and destroy 
or try to destroy the rest.'®' 
While Cover's work is no doubt justly celebrated for its profound depth 
of noble feeling, it certainly does not operate at the Lacanian level. In 
Cover's view, law is de-centered. It is not the property of the state. 
Rather, it encompasses the norms of diverse communities. 
Communities, not the state, are the hallmarks of political virtue.'®^ In 
short what we have here is basically the new age theme of let a 
thousand flowers bloom."'®^ What is missing from this account is the 
judge's very act of deciding always kills all law, even the law it 
infinite judgment, see Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, The Appearance of Wrong and 
the Essence of Right, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2481 (2003). 
98 SIGMUND FREUD, TOTEM AND TABOO (STANDARD EDITION) (James Strachey trans., 
1996) For Lacan's rewriting of this myth, see Jacques Lacan, Introduction to the Names-ofthe-
Father Seminar, in JACQUEI LACAN, TELEVISION: A TO THE 
ESTABLISHMENT 81 (Jeffrey Mehlman trans., Joan Copjec ed., 1990) (1974), ZI2EK, TICKLISH 
SUBJECT, 5MPRA note 24, at 314-18. R , .I. „ » 
99 See eg Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority in 
DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 3 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., Mary 
Quaintance trans., 1992). /i 
100 See Robert M. Cover, Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (I9»J). 
102 See Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 1, 
57-59 n989y 
103 See generally Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: 
Legal Model in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 823-32 (199 ). 
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purports to uphold,and that legal reasoning is the psychoanalytic cure 
the judge must undertake to assuage the guilt. 
The speculative inquiry inspired by Hegel and Lacan shows law to 
be much more violent that Cover imagined and also less so. It is more 
so in that every act of judge and subject alike traumatizes the symbolic 
order Hegel and Lacan exult in the violence of law at this level. Cover 
abhon-ed it (thus revealing his fundamental romanticism).It is less 
violent than Cover imagined because submission to and transgression oi 
law constitutes the ordinary course of social growth. For Cover, when 
law is violent, it is catastrophic to its victims. Hence, Cover implies a 
division between violent and non-violent judicial acts. Lacan saw the 
violence in every single act—judicial or laic. 
INTERPRETATION 
Once a human being acts in violation of the law, a traumatic event 
has occurred. Trauma is that which disturbs the equilibrium of the 
symbolic order. In order to re-establish this equilibrium, the subject 
must "interpret" or "subjectify" the act, if she can.'''^ 
This interpretation constitutes the rearrangement of the symbolic 
order of law. Interpretation always entails the discovery of a 
cause.It establishes a new symbolic network by means of which 
"[hlistory again acquires the self-evidence of a linear evolution, 
Once the act is symbolized—made subject to the rule of law the 
trauma disappears. This is "the moment of closure when the subject s 
act ofdecision changes into its opposite."'!" The trauma is "cured. 
The interpretation may well be, "She acted legally, even morally. 
Thus, when you bought your carton of milk for the required price with 
valid currency, you are subsequently judged innocent. Any such 
judgment, after the deed, claims that you had no spark of originality in 
104 Thus legal interpretation merely threatens violence, implying that nonviolent mterpr^tion 
might be possible. See Robert M. Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretatton: Of the 
Word the Deed, and the le,f • i,, 
105 One may also complain of Cover that, although he celebrates the particulansin of mstUar 
communities, he speaks in the name of a universality that he does not actaowledp. e 
universalism is the violence Cover abhors. Hence, he is just as violent as those he criticizes. See 
ZIZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, SMPRA note 24, at 170. • u- v, .i t ft,» anH 
106 Cover thus exhibits the pose of the "beautiful soul" who wnngs his hands at the world and 
wishes to be aloof from it, but is, contrary to this pose, just as implicated in it as is anyone else. 
supra note 1, at 63. Of course, the subject may attempt to repress the trauma aiid 
refuse to confront it-a less healthy alternative. ZIZEK, PLAGUE OF FANTASIES, supra note 
32, at 79. ^ 
108 See ZIZEK, ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL FACTOR , supra note 19, at loi. 
109 Id. at 190. 
110 Id. 
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your act. In effect, you are treated as an unfree object incapable of 
creativity. You are accused of perfect plagiarism, as it were. Thus, in 
your acquittal lurks the accusation of yet another high crime and 
misdemeanor.'" 
This judgment, however, is more in the nature of a pardon than an 
acquittal. Such a judgment deliberately overlooks the act's lawlessness. 
The truth of your acquittal is that you really deserved to be condemned. 
Instead of condemning you, the underlying law has been retroactively 
conformed to accommodate your earlier lawless act. Presume not that 
the law is the thing it was. Rather, the trauma of your act disrupted the 
former law. Your act has been fully symbolized in a brand new law."^ 
The innocence you have been accorded is the mercy of the big Other, 
which has elected to sacrifice and transform itself in order to smooth 
over your criminal act—your jouissance of that pathological carton of 
milk. 
What we have here is not legal judgment but mercy, precisely 
because it cannot be demanded. Subjects are constantly demanding 
"justice" from the symbolic order—the missing part to which the 
s u b j e c t  i s  e n t i t l e d  a n d  w h i c h  w o u l d  m a k e  t h e  s u b j e c t  w h o l e . T h e  
symbolic order never listens to the demand for justice. It is no "strict 
court of Venice." Only when the subject learns not to demand justice 
does the symbolic order condescend to forgive the subject's crime."'' 
If the pattern keeps up—if action wins forgiveness after the fact— 
we invoke a rather different, more flexible notion of what law is. The 
conclusion that an act was consistent with pre-existent law means that 
law is defined differently from its strict correlative form of superegoic 
law. In such a definition, law is not an aggregate of particulars, but an 
aggregate of universal principles, under which a legal actor is accorded 
some scope of freedom. So conceived, law no longer represents the 
superego. But the price is the betrayal of conservative principles. Law 
no longer precedes the act. 
" ' I n  H e g e l ' s  w o r d s ,  t h e  s t r i c t n e s s  o f  t h e  s u p e r e g o  ( w h a t  H e g e l  c a l l s  " f a t e " )  " o f t e n  s e e m s  t o  
pass over into the most crying injustice when it makes its appearance, more terrible than ever, 
over against the most exalted form of guilty, the guilt of innocenee." G.W.F. HEGEL, The Spirit 
of Christianity and its Fate, in EARLY THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS 232 (T.M. Knox trans., 1948). 
"2 See FINK, supra note 1, at 71 ("To understand means to locate or embed one configuration 
of signifiers within another. ... [Sjomething makes sense when it fits into the pre-existing 
chain."). 
"3 On this aspect of justice, see generally Carlson, supra note 8. 
"4 See ZIZEK, TARRYING WITH THENEGATIVE, supra note 41, at 169. Why, then, should one 
do "good" acts when there is no guaranty that the symbolic order will render the deeds of mercy? 
Grace is like the rain. It falls where it falls. Perhaps it will fall on the fertile plain, perhaps on the 
barren hillside. If the peasant does the good deed of cultivating the plain, the peasant will profit if 
the rain happens to fall on the plain. But cultivation never guarantees the rainfall. See liiEK, 
PLAGUE OF FANTASIES, supra note 32, at 79. The very possibility of the good act presupposes 
that the subject can rebel against the existing order in the name of a better order. See ZIZEK, 
ABYSS OF FREEDOM, supra note 26, at 54. 
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NARRATIVE 
In the above account, every act violates the pre-existing, 
determinate law of the superego. The subject must, in effect, forget the 
law in order to act."^ The act is a pre-rational, "Real" event that 
crashes through the trappings of the symbolic realm and encounters the 
Real. 
The subject, in this account, is always alienated from her own act. 
This follows from the Lacanian definition of the subject. In Lacanian 
terms, the subject is the gap between the symbolic and the Real. If the 
subject is this gap, and if acts are in the Real, then it follows that the 
agent is always alienated and separate from (yet author of) its act. 
Furthermore, as the act contains the element of subjective responsibility, 
the subject alienated from the act is always self-alienated. The subject 
is literally caught in the act. 
When a subject acts, she is always, to some degree, surprised by 
what she has wrought. The act teaches the subject who she is and what 
she is capable of. One might say that an actress performs for an 
audience, but, uncannily, the actress is always in the audience herself, 
witnessing her own act—a wonder wounded hearer amidst the 
groundsmen."^ 
Phenomenologically, the subject is a series of traumatic acts 
recollected across time."'' The self-conscious subject is the negative 
unity that strings together all these acts into a coherent whole over time. 
Memory of what she did requires a continuity of self from day to day. 
This implies that the subject breaks free from the present and recognizes 
herself as a "universal" that is separate and apart from the present. In 
other words, in her acts, the subject transcends the natural present and 
becomes historicized. Acts, in contrast, being Real events, do not exist 
in time. Only the self-conscious subject, remembering the now-
symbolized act, has any sense of time. Self-consciousness is nothing 
but unity over time. What it unites are the symbolized acts of a lifetime. 
Every act by the subject is a trauma. The act is at bottom an 
115 See ZIZEK, LOOKING AWRY, supra note 30, at 212. 
11® See COPJEC, READ MY DESIRE, supra note 5, at xvi ("human will can only realize itself in 
a content that alienates it from itself. . . "); ZUPANCIC, supra note 16, at 225 ("I experience my 
own enjoyment... as strange and hostile."). This explains why Zizek can write of the act as a 
foreign body or intruder in the subject, and why the actor must always keep a distance from her 
own acts. See ZIZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 374. "The act thus designates the 
level at which the fundamental division and displacements usually associated with the 'Lacanian 
subject' ... are momentarily suspended . ..." Id. at 375. If it were otherwise, the agent would 
then be at the level of the act. See id. at 376. Here we would have Adam and Eve (i.e., sexual 
perversion), and Kant's puppet of God. See supra note 56 
117 See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 12, § 124.; see also JOSEPH C. FLAY, 
HEGEL'S QUEST FOR CERTAINTY 137 (1984). 
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unconscious act"^ that disrupts the fantasy realm. Fantasy is in turn the 
narrative the subject has constructed about herself and what she is. 
Thus, a subject learns what she is by contemplating her acts."' 
Together, the others—and the actress herself—will symbolize the 
traumatic act and reestablish a new order."® Once the act is 
symbolized, "[t]he pricks of conscience have become blunt, since Ae 
deed's evil spirit has been chased away; there is no longer anything 
hostile in the man, and the deed remains at most as a soulless carcass 
lying in the charnel-house of actualities, in memories.""^ This 
exorcism of the act is what narration aims at. 
The narrative that the agent constructs about her acts constitutes 
the very stuff of legal reasoning. In the narrative, the subject learns that 
she acted because of reasons A, B, and C. Cause is retroactively posited 
to explain the act so that the trauma of acting can be integrated into the 
fantasy in which the subject lives.Thus, cause is much more 
radically conceived in psychoanalysis than in ordinary science. Cause 
in science is the law. Cause in psychoanalysis is precisely that which 
disrupts the law."^ 
Narrative acts are always failures. They never completely remove 
the trauma of the act. Recall that, in Lacanian terms, the subject is 
always a gap between the symbolic and the Real. Entry into the 
symbolic realm of law constitutes the historicization of acts by the 
subject. The symbolic materials expropriated by the subject to describe 
her acts do not constitute a positive whole. Rather, the subject is a 
negative unity holding together various shards of symbolic material, but 
there is always something missing to fill out the gap."^ What is missing 
118 See FINK, supra note 1, at 37. 
119 See PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT, supra note 35, § 401 ("Consciousness must act merely in 
order that what it is in itself may become explicit/or it.. . action is simply the coming-to-be of 
Spirit as consciousness")-, JEAN HYPPOLITE, GENESIS AND STRUCTURE OF KEGELS 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 12 (Samuel Chemiak & John Heckman trans., 1974) ( But action is 
necessary, and through it the self of self-consciousness emerges from its obscurity and becomes 
dctufll 
120 siavoj Ziiek, The Cartesian Subject versus the Cartesian Theater, in SlC 2: COGITO AND 
THE UNCONSCIOUS 246, 256 (Slavoj Zizek ed., 1998) ("[T]he answer to the question 'Why do we 
tell stories?' is that the narrative as such emerges in order to resolve some fundamental 
antagonism by way of rearranging its terms into a temporal succession.''); see also 
STAVRAKAKIS, supra note 6, at 86 ("In the face of the irreducibility of the real we have no other 
option but to symbolize "). 
121 HEGEL,II/PRAnote 111,at232. ^ u i .i-
122 Needless to say, there is voluminous literature on law and narrative. One of the leading 
progenitors of this movement, Richard Delgado, recognizes the therapeutic nature of narrative 
(for the "out" groups), but he also adds that the narratives of the "outs" are traumatic for the 
"ins." See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 
MICH. L.REV. 2411,2412(1989). 
123 See FINK, supra note 1, at 28, 64. 
124 I'LJ. at 140-41. . , . , „ 
125 See COPJEC, READ MY DESIRE, supra note 5, at 125 ("In response to anxiety s signal ot 
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is the objet petit a. 
The objet petit a is one of Lacan's profound contributions to 
philosophy. 126 This object is the "little other"i27—the material that, if 
acquired, supposedly would make the subject whole. The act is 
always an attempt to obtain this objet petit a. 
The objet petit a, however, is a paradoxical object. It is in fact a 
non-object—a metonym.i2s short, the idea of the Thing that would 
make the subject whole is a falsehood, a "not," and an impossibility. 
We search in vain for it in positive reality. Yet the objet petit a can only 
be perceived if it has a positive content. Hence, the subject constantly 
"sublimates." Sublimation is integration of the objet petit a into the 
order of the signifier.'29 That is, a positive thing is associated with the 
objet petit a. It is '"elevated to the dignity of the Thing.We feel 
pain because we don't have some thing—an unrequited love or a really 
"good" law review acceptance. If only we could get this one thing, 
everything would be all right.in fact, this Thing is simply a place­
holder for the negative object petit a. 
The "aet," always an attempt to obtain the Thing, is doomed to fail. 
Even if we win a token of love or a prestigious academic position, we 
only discover that the thing obtained was not really the objet petit a. An 
uncaptured surplus enjoyment exceeds that actual sublimated object we 
have obtained. 122 The act is destined to fail, even when it succeeds. 
Indeed, a truly successful act would mean closure and death. 
Not only is the act unsuccessful, but the narrative account of the 
act is likewise unsuccessful. This is because every attempt to fill this 
gap with words—^the post hoc narrative to excuse our act—is itself an 
'ID*'' IM hKK' 
danger, one flees or avoids the real. But one flees into a symbolic whose hedge against the real is 
secured only through its negation of the real, that is, through its failure to eoineide with itself, to 
guarantee itself"). 
126 See FINK, supra note 1, at 83. 
122 The small letter a stands for flwtre, or other. 
128 Metonymy is the inability to name the thing directly, but only the context surrounding the 
thing. Metonymy so defined recognizes the negative constitution of things. See Michel 
Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject, in LAW AND THE POSTMODERN MIND: 
ESSAYS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS AND JURISPRUDENCE 157-65 (Peter Goodrich & David Gray 
Carlson eds., 1998); Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Midas Touch: The Lethal Effect of Wealth 
Maximization, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 687, 763 ("In metonymy, the signified always remains hidden, 
and negative.") [hereinafter Schroeder, Midas Touch], 
129 See ZizEK, ABYSS OF FREEDOM, supra note 26, at 78. 
130 SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE FRAGILE ABSOLUTE OR. WHY IS THE CHRISTIAN LEGACY WORTH 
FIGHTING FOR? 26 (2000). 
131 The objet petit a as lost object only comes to be by being left behind. Narrative occludes 
the paradox by describing the process in which the object is first given and then gets lost. See 
ZIZEK, PLAGUE OF FANTASIES, supra note 32, at 13. Fullness is "a retroactively produced 
fiction." STAVRAKAKIS, supra note 6, at 44. 
132 Perhaps someone stole this surplus enjoyment. If so, we have the architectonic of racism 
or anti-semitism. See RENATA SALECL, THE SPOILS OF FREEDOM: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND 
FEMINISM AFTER THE FALL OF SOCIALISM (1994). 
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act. Acts are doomed to fail. That is, narrative is "performance" which, 
by definition, must fail. 
In short, speaking or even thinking'^^ is an act. Far from being the 
stuff of rationality, thinking—no matter how logical or programmatic— 
is paradoxically unconscious activity.'^"* It is for this reason that 
Descartes was disastrously wrong when he hazarded the proposition, "I 
think, therefore I am.'''^^ If we focus solely the result "I am," the "I" 
has symbolic reality. It is a concept. It "is." But this I is radieally 
ineommensurate with the I that thinks. This I is not. Hence, what 
Descartes should have written is, "I think, therefore I am not,"!^^ or "I 
am not where I think,"'^^ or "I do not think, therefore I am, or 
"either I think or I am,"'^^ or "I am, therefore it thinks,"'^ or "I think, 
therefore an obscene, sadistic superego specter is watching me,""*i or 
Freud's 'Wo es war, soil Ich werden."^"^^ Ironically, Descartes said the 
one thing that cannot be sustained: "I think, therefore I am. 
In spite of the paradox of the Cogito, the "thing that thinks"^'*'' 
always "posits" itself as existent—a negative (positing) unity wiA 
infinite positive properties. The cogito cannot sustain itself in 
negativity alone. It must return to the symbolic order if it is to be. 
133 See FINK, supra note 1, atl06 (stating that thought itself isjouissance-Xaden)-, Zizek, supra 
note 120, at 266 ("The conclusion to be drawn is thus ... that self-consciousness itself is radically 
unconscious")-, 2LZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 97 (stating that knowledge is 
performative). 
134 Or as Zizek puts it; "[l]n order to be 'effective' at the ontic level, one must disregard the 
ontological horizon of one's activity. (In this sense, Heidegger emphasizes that 'science doesn t 
think' and that, far from being its limitation, this inability is the very motor of scientific 
progress.)" ilZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 15. See also Stephen M. Feldman, 
Playing with the Pieces: Postmodernism in the Lawyer's Toolbox, 85 VA. L. REV. 151, 179 
(1999) ("Regardless of how postmodern a writer seeks to be, if she writes an essay or, for that 
matter, communicates in any matter at all, then she must somehow domesticate 
postmodernism."). 
135 Rene Descartes, Meditation II: Of the Nature of the Human Mind, in THE MEDIATIONS 
AND SELECTIONS FROM THE PRINCIPLES OF RENE DESCARTES (John Veitch trans., 1962) (1901). 
136 See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Three's a Crowd: A Feminist Critique of Calabresi & Melamed's 
One View of the Cathedral, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 396 (1999). 
137 See Dolar, supra note 18, at 28. 
138 See ANDREW HAAS, HEGEL AND THE PROBLEM OF MULTIPLICITY 236 (2000) ("L negate, 
therefore, 1 am."). 
139 See Dolar, supra note 18, at 18; LACAN, supra note 4, at 211. 
140 ZI2EK. TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE, supra note 41, at 59 (emphasis added). 
According to Zizek, this is the masculine version of the cogito, which insists on self-presence and 
relegates thinking to the unconscious. The feminine position chooses thought and therefore 
vanishes to an empty point of apperception, as in the myth of Echo and Narcissus. See id. 
141 ZI2EK. ENJOY YOUR SYMPTOM, supra note 92, at 127. 
142 FINK, supra note 1, at 47 (translated as "where it was, there 1 shall be"). 
143 The precise error of Descartes "consists in substantializing this empty spot of cogito by 
turning it into res cogitans." Dolar, supra note 18, at 16. 
144 See SCIENCE OF LOGIC, supra note 22, at 116 ("[B]y this T, or if you like, it (the thing) 
that thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendent suject of thoughts = x, which is 
cognized only through the thoughts which are its predicates "). 
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"What eventually remains, is a pure vanishing point without a 
counterpart, which can only be sustained in a minimal gestme of 
enunciation."^''^ In short, thinking ultimately depends on its product— 
the thought, the signifier.'''® 
This existent which the thinking subject must become is always 
fully present to the acting subject (even as the non-acting subject stands 
aloof from this all-encompassing present). In her act, the subject always 
totalizes.''''' Suppose the thinking subject contemplates itself—the 
symbolic "I" that "is." This I is not only present, but fully so. Yet, 
while she contemplates her own self in its totality, the subject is not 
truly self-conscious. The thinking self is not self-conscious when it acts 
{i.e., thinks).This capacity for the unity of action and knowledge 
(what Kant called an "intellectual intuition")'"^ was, according to 
Augustine, lost for us when Eve ate the apple.Rather, the thing that 
thi^s presupposes a totalized universe and an all-consuming presence, 
but from this totality it has itself withdrawn. 
Totalization is vital to the logic of "meaning." Meaning is the 
precise, successful coincidence between signifler and signified. 
Meaning is only successful in a thoroughly static symbolic order. By 
way of an example, if I have a mental picture that 1 wish to 
communicate, 1 must describe the picture completely in words. There 
must be nothing left out. Nor must the words add anything to the 
picture. 1 tell my vision to you. You understand my meaning when you 
receive these words and the corresponding picture to which they refer 
completely. There can be no room for slippage or surplus. This is what 
"meaning" requires. Anything less demotes meaning to mere 
interpretation.'51 
Yet a surplus is always there to betray meaning.'52 The surplus is 
precisely the "1 think" who speaks the words that "are" and is hence 
alienated from them. The attempt to "mean" is itself an act and must 
always fail. The thing that thinks always stands over against her 
totalizing activity. His words are never complete. Furthermore, words. 
'45 Dolar, supra note 18, at 15. 
'45 See id. at 19. 
'41 On the totalizing nature of thinking, see FLAY, supra note 117, at 57, 137. 
'48 See ZLZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 62 (noting that cogito is the subject of the 
unconscious). 
'49 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 9, at 163-64. 
'50 See ZLZEK, PLAGUE OF FANTASIES, supra note 32, at 14-16. 
'5' See LACAN, supra note 4, at 212 (interpretation reduces signifiers to their nonmeaning "so 
as to find the determinants of the whole of the subject's behavior"). 
'52 See ZlZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 33, 106. Zizek portrays meaning as a 
fantasy structure that papers over the suture of the Real so that the Real becomes a kind of screen 
onto which meaningful "movies" can be projected. See ZlZEK, PLAGUE OF FANTASIES, supra 
note 32, at 160 ("There is no meaning without some dark spot, without some 
forbidden/impenetrable domain into which we project fantasies which guarantee our horizon of 
meaning."). 
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being public commodities, arc pret a porter—never tailor-made. They 
never fit the subject. Hence, they bring extra content to the fore that 
exceeds the subject. 
PRAGMATISM 
So far, cognitive thought has been revealed to be irrational, 
impulsive, imthinking action.'" Descartes has been denounced for 
inferring that, just because he thought, he perforce "existed." Surely 
something must be wrong with this account. In particular, you may 
think the following: the account may be adequate for "impulsive" acts, 
but not for "deliberative" act. 1 have occasionally acted impulsively. 
On such occasions, the meaning of the acts could only be retrieved after 
the fact. And admittedly, if 1 truly act under the constraint of impulse, 
the act's legality is a matter of good fortune or dumb luck. But, unlike 
my impulsive acts, my deliberative acts have been rationally thought 
out. Especially with regard to important decisions, such as changing 
jobs or getting married, 1 have weighed the costs and benefits. 1 have 
pondered hard and 1 have reached a decision. I acted according to this 
decision. No doubt, my deliberated acts sometimes turn out badly. For 
example, I was fired and got divorced. Nevertheless, at the time 1 acted, 
1 acted from grounds of sufficient reason. 
This account, based on the experience of deliberating and then 
acting in accordance with pragmatic reason, must be interpreted as the 
deceptive product of "self and vain conceit."'" What is portrayed as a 
forward-looking reasoning process is in fact a retroactively created 
narration no different from the process admitted with regard to the 
i m p u l s i v e  a c t .  A c t i o n  i s  a l w a y s  i m p u l s i v e  a n d  n e v e r  d e l i b e r a t e d . I f  
you think otherwise, then you deny the faet of the unconscious and 
claim the possibility of an intellectual intuition. 
153 See ZliEK, PLAGUE OF FANTASIES, supra note 32, at 223 (describing that the act occnrs as 
a crazy, unaccountable event which is precisely not willed). 
154 According to Shakespeare: 
For within the hollow crown 
That rounds the mortal temples of a king 
Keeps Death his court, and there the antic sits 
Scoffing at his state and grirming at his pomp. 
Allowing him a breath, a scene or two. 
To monarchise, be feared, and kill with looks. 
Infusing him with self and vain conceit. . . 
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II act 3, § 2. 
155 See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Beyond Good and Evil, in BASIC WRITINGS OF NIETZSCHE § 
32 (Walter Kaufmann ed., 1968) ("The intention as the whole origin and pre-history of an 
action—almost to the present day this prejudice dominated moral praise, blame, judgment, and 
philosophy on earth."). 
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The problem with pragmatic conceit is that, like strictly legal 
discourse, it denies human freedom. According to the pragmatic 
account, the deliberated act was not freely done. Rather, the subject 
was "bound" by the reasons developed in advance of the act. If true, 
this means that the act was not an act. Rather, it was just a mechanical, 
unfree "repetition" of its ground. The act was not free at all but entirely 
pathological, as Kant would say.'^^ 
At best, all that pragmatic reality achieves is to throw the true act 
back to a point earlier in time. When a pragmatist contemplates what to 
do and then does it in obedience to his earlier deliberations, no free 
human being was responsible for this so-called act. Rather, the 
"reasons" are to blame. The pragmatist who blames his reasons for his 
act is simply trying to avoid responsibility—to win acquittal before the 
superegoic court. But, as we have seen, the pragmatist's unseemly 
whining and finger pointing at his so-called reasons can never win him 
an acquittal. The pragmatist who pins the tail of blame on the donkey 
of reason slanders his own freedom by such behavior. As Shakespeare 
put it: 
This is the excellent foppery of the world, that, when we are sick in 
fortune,—often the surfeit of our own behaviour,—we make guilty 
156 See CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 37, at 48. Kant suggests that the very 
existence of ethics depends on our finite natures—our inability to sustain an immediate relation to 
God: 
But instead of the conflict that the moral disposition has now to carry on with the 
in c l i n a t i o n s ,  . . .  God  and  e t e rn i t y  . . .  would  s t an d  unceas ing ly  be f o re  our  eye s  . . . .  
Transgression of the law, would, no doubt, be avoided. . . . but the mental disposition, 
from which actions ought to proceed, carmot be infused by any command, and in this 
case the spur of action is ever active and external, so that reason has no need to exert 
itself in order to gather strength to resist the inclinations by a lively representation of 
the dignity of the law: hence most of the actions that conformed to the law would be 
done from fear, a few only from hope, and none at all from duty, and the moral worth 
of actions ... would cease to exist. As long as the nature of man remains what it is, his 
conduct would thus be changed into mere mechanism, in which, as in a puppet show, 
everything would gesticulate well, but there would be no life in the figures. Now, 
when it is quite otherwise with us, when with all the effort of our reason we have only 
a very obscure and doubtful view into the future, when the Governor of the world 
allows us only to conjecture His existence and His majesty, not to behold them or 
prove them clearly;and, on the other hand, the moral law within us, without promising 
or threatening anything with certainty, demands of us disinterested respect; and only 
when this respect has become active and dominant does it allow us by means of it a 
prospect into the world of the supersensible, and then only with weak glances; all this 
being so, there is room for true moral disposition, immediately devoted to the law, and 
a rational creature can become worthy of sharing in the summum bonum that 
corresponds to the worth of his person and not merely to his actions. Thus what the 
study of nature and of man teaches us sufficiently elsewhere may well be true here 
also; that the tmsearchable wisdom by which we exist is not less worthy of admiration 
in what it has denied than in what it has granted. 
Id. at 175-76. See also ZI2EK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 325 (attributing the same 
point to Malebranche). 
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of our disasters the sun, the moon, and the stars 
A pragmatist can no more blame her reasons for the act than the 
treacher can blame the stars. The fault, however, is not in the stars. 
In pragmatic philosophy, the act is not the product of reason. 
Rather, the act occurs in the development of the reasons. The adoption 
of reasons was the irrational, unconscious act. Having "acted" by 
formulating reasons, the pragmatic subject surrenders her freedom to 
these reasons, goes to sleep, as it were, and proceeds mechanically. 
Reason therefore is made to take the blame. 
Pragmatism, the illusion that we can follow our reasons, therefore 
can be seen as a hatred of freedom and dread of responsibility. In short, 
it is just another version of superegoic law. Like the superego, the 
conceit of pragmatic intentionality presupposes the possibility that it can 
fill the legal universe and know with certainty its own consequences. 
In truth, whether the pragmatist likes it or not, the adoption of 
reasons was an act, but following the reasons was yet another. As 
Nietzsche put it: 
everything about [action] that is intentional, everything about it that 
can be seen, known, "conscious," still belongs to its surface and 
skin—which, like every skin, betrays something but conceals even 
more. In short... intention is merely a sign and symptom that still 
requires interpretation. . . 
Even upon careful deliberation, the subject was indeed free to ignore the 
reasons developed earlier. Having deliberated, the subject can pause 
and change her mind at any time. Indeed, given the fact that the 
subject's act exceeds the prior symbolic order, the pragmatic act must 
likewise exceed the prior reasons. The act is always overdetermined. 
The pragmatist can never list all the reasons that truly caused the act. 
From the above account, it should be clear that the myth of the 
deliberative act presupposes a subject with no unconscious. Such a 
subject supposes herself to be fully present, fully transparent to herself. 
She is successfully self-identical. She knows why she acted. There is 
no gap between the Real and the Symbolic, in such a subject. 
Self-identity, however, is an impossible position. Subjectivity is 
precisely the very failure of self-identity—it is distance from the 
symbolic order and likewise distance from the Real. Hence, the myth of 
the deliberative act—and of the self-identity of the subject—is what 
157 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 1, § 2. 
158 In Shakespearean terms; 
Nay, if we talk of reason. 
Let's shut the gates and sleep: manhood and honour 
Should have harehearts, would they but fat their thoughts 
With this cramm'd reason. 
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TROILUS AND CRESSIDA act 2, § 2. 
159 NIETZSCHE, supra note 155, § 32. 
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psychoanalysis calls a fantasy. If deliberation validly captures the 
reality of the situation, there is no subject in the first place. The "thing 
that thinks" is left out. We have only the poorer, passive, impotent half 
of the Cogito. 
In short, the subject is not licensed to warrant in advance that an 
act is purely caused by deliberative reason. The act occurs for whatever 
r e a s o n  i t  o c c u r s  ( n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  t h e  r e a s o n s  w e  p u t  f o r t h ) . O u r  
account of the matter is not necessarily its truth. Indeed, there is always 
a surplus beyond the reasons stated, no matter how exhaustive the 
reasoning process has been. The act is doomed to be traumatic. The act 
becomes truly symbolized only after the fact.i®' 
EFFECT AND CAUSE 
Causation may be defined as necessary temporal sequencel^^ 
Supposedly, cause precedes effect. Yet, in the above account, the act 
(effect) was first and its cause (as narrated) a distant second. 
Yet cause can simultaneously precede effect,, thanks to the future 
anterior grammar of performativity.'^^ The act was a performance an 
unconscious act that presupposed a totalizing presence. Coeval and 
synchronous to the act was the objet petit a—that which caused the act. 
The narration excusing the act was likewise a performance. It gave 
content to the objet petit a. But this does not mean that narration is 
unstructured. Zizek puts it this way: 
"[Pjerformativity" in no way designates the power of freely 
160 ^ccorJRlCHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 149-50 (1990). 
161 Thus, Zizek describes the noir philosopher Blaise Pascal as putting forth the proposition 
that ideology always implies irrational obedience. The network of reasons masks the unbearable 
fact that law is always "positive"—grounded only in its own act of enunciation. Argumentation 
is for the crowd of ordinary people who need the illusion that there are good and proper reasons 
for the orders they must obey. The true secret, known only to the elite, is that the dogma of 
power is grounded only in itself. See ZI2EK, PLAGUE OF FANTASIES, supra note 32, at 175. See 
also Zi2ek, Obscene Supplement, supra note 47, at 76: 
[0]ne should reserve the Enlightenment notion according to which, to the ordinary 
people unable to grasp the need for their religious belief, the truth of their religion has 
to be asserted in an authoritarian way, as a dogma that needs no arguments, while the 
enlightened elite is able to obey upon being convinced by good reasons the 
uncanny truth is rather that argumentation is for the crowd of "'ordinary people'" who 
need the illusion that there are good and proper reasons for the order that they must 
obey, while the true secret known only to the elites is that the dogma of power is 
grounded only in itself. .. . Law is grounded only in its own act of enunciation. 
Id. Zizek also suggests that reasons to do something are always at least minimally retroactively 
posited by the act of decision they ground. Only once we decide to believe do reasons become 
convincing to us, not vice versa. See ZLZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 19. 
>62 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 9, at 93. 
163 See JACQUES LACAN, ECRITS: A SELECTION 86 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) ("what 1 shall 
have been for what I am in the process of becoming"). 
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"creating" the designated content ("words mean what we want them 
to mean," etc.): the "quilting" [performativity] only structures the 
material which is found, externally imposed. The act of naming is 
"performative" only and precisely insofar as it is always-already part 
of the definition of the signified content}^ 
In other words, narrative is not radically separate from what it describes. 
Here at last we arrive at the conservative payoff of this essay. Legal 
reasoning is always implicated in the judicial act. The former enjoys a 
unity with the latter. Recall that the act was a real event, an 
omnipresence. If the act was an omnipresence, then "reason" must have 
been in the omnipresence. If reason had been excluded, we would have 
before us less than an omnipresence. 
In the act, the subject ''posits himself as his own cause .... 
This is, incidentally, the secret message of the Coase theorem. Ronald 
Coase's famous article. The Problem of Social Cost,'^^^ is usually cited 
for the proposition that, in a world with no transaction costs (i.e., the 
Lacanian Real), parties will bargain to reallocate legal entitlement 
efficiently. But another way of making the same point is that cause is 
always "positive"—that is, a legal question. As such, effect always 
precedes cause; cause can only be assigned after the fact in a 
judgment.Hence, if there are any lingering doubts about the 
conservative credentials of this article, it may be noted that retroactively 
posited cause is precisely the point of the Coase Theorem and hence of 
Law and Economics generally. 
B\en though causal narrative (i.e., law) is retroactively performed, 
it nevertheless captures something synchronous with the act. Narrative 
may be post hoc, but it describes cause, which is coterminous with and 
also precedes the act. In the narration, then, we have the past, present, 
and future of the act.'^*^ In short, the narration totalizes the act. It 
164 ZI^EK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE, supra note 41, at 150 (footnotes omitted). 
165 ZIIEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 375. 
166 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). , , , ^ 
167 Or more simply, in a universe that instantly corrects all legal errors, legal errors do not 
matter. We are setting to one side the good point that no subjects exist at all in the Lacanian real. 
168 In setting forth a parable about a man who builds a house with a chimney and a man who 
builds a wall such that the smoke does not draw correctly from the chimney (filling the house 
with smoke), Coase considers who is to "blame": 
Tlie answer seems fairly clear. The smoke nuisance was caused both by the man who 
built the wall andhy the man who lit the fires. Given the fires, there would have been 
no smoke nuisance without the wall; given the wall, there would have been no smoke 
nuisance without the fire. Eliminate the wall or the fire and the smoke nuisance would 
disappear. 
Id. at 13. 
169 As Robert Cover saw: . ... 
The very imposition of a normative force upon a state of affairs, real or imagined, is 
the act of creating narrative. The various genres of narrative—history, fiction, tragedy, 
comedy—are alike in their being the account of states of affairs affected by a 
normative force field. To live in a legal world requires that one know not only the 
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renders the act visible in the symbolic order and also historicizes it, by 
attributing diachrony to what is actually synchrony. Narration 
symbolizes the act—it is "recollection," or retrieval of repressed 
material from the unconscious.'™ Narration retroactively separates out 
cause which, in the narrative, precedes the act. 
But narration is itself yet another act and therefore never 
successful. The cause of action can never entirely be stated. Something 
else is always left out of the pleading, which must always be dismissed 
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superegoic Rules of Civil Procedure, 
because meaning—a mere fantasy structure of totality—forever eludes 
us. Superegoic law recognizes no cause of action. Demurrer is its only 
procedure.'^' 
Instead, action can only be interpreted. In this interpretation, the 
action is made subject to a rule—a preexisting law.'^^ The free act is 
fully symbolized and hence retroactively turns into the opposite of what 
it was—unfree and subject to the rule of law.' 
An interpretation might be wrong. But, on the other hand, it might 
be right. How can we tell? Alas, whatever we decide is itself an 
interpretation—of the interpretation. We can never know the past 
directly. It becomes known to us as it is being transformed in an 
interpretive performance. Hence the future anterior grammar of 
interpretation. Interpretation always intervenes in—wades into and 
pervades—the object. The object observed is not unaffected by the 
observation. Yet only through the transformation of the object in 
narration does it become visible to us. We are like the Tyrannosaurus 
Rex. We can only see what moves. If a thing does not move, we are 
unable to interpret it.'™ That which is not interpreted is simply 
forgotten and truly becomes "the past." The past we actually know is 
precepts, but also their connections to possible and plausible states of affairs. It 
requires that one integrate not only the "is" and the "ought," but the "is," the "ought," 
and the "what might be." Narrative so integrates these domains. Narratives are models 
through which we study and experience transformations that result when a given 
simplified state of affairs is made to pass through the force field of a similarly 
simplified set of norms. 
Cover, supra note 100, at 10. From a Lacanian perspective, these sentiments are imprecise. A 
state of affairs is never real but always imagined, and is not distinguishable from the narrative 
itself. Furthermore, the "ought" refers to the "in-itself or potential of a thing. As such, it is in 
the set of "what might be"—along with externally produced injustices upon the thing, or the 
"ought not." Finally, the collision of simplified states would appear to be what Lacan would call 
"trauma," but Cover is most vague on what he means. Nevertheless, he does seem to portray 
narrative as an omnipresence in which past, present and future are united. 
110 SEE HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND § 451 (William Wallace & A.V. Miller trans., 1971); 
iliEK, ABYSS OF FREEDOM, supra note 26, at 37-38. 
111 This is the point of Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 97. 
172 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 9, at 71,134. 
173 ZIZEK, ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL FACTOR, supra note 19, at 188. 
174 Here 1 extrapolate from the movie version of Jurassic Park—the source of most of what 
we know about the dinosaurs. 
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always present. 
These observations are by no means designed to condemn the 
enterprise of finding correct legal answers. Quite the opposite should 
be apparent. Meaning is always elusive but nevertheless "real." 
Interpretation of an act becomes meaning when the interpreter erases 
herself entirely in her act of interpretation.in Kantian terms, the 
interpreter has a duty to interpret the object correctly. This requires, 
however, the perfect moral autonomy of the interpreter. In the pose of 
correct interpretation, the interpreter banishes all pathological criteria 
which might distort the object interpreted. The non-pathological self 
must let the thing speak for itself. It is the duty of the interpreter to 
become the vanishing mediator who makes the object perfectly 
transparent to the consumer of the interpretation. When the interpreter 
perfectly performs the moral imperative incident to interpretation, we 
have reached the realm of meaning.^'^^ 
Why is self-erasure necessary? Zizek suggests: "Because a 
symbolic system has by definition the character of totality, there is 
meaning only if everything has meaning."''^' In the realm of meaning, 
there is no room for subjective caprice or freedom. Right answers are 
possible only if human freedom erases itself. The very duty of the 
interpreter is to efface herself entirely—so that superegoic law can 
speak without distortion. In meaning, the subject finally comports with 
what superegoic law demands.'''^ 
Attainment of meaning requires perfect self-transparency. Yet a 
subject can never be sure she is perfectly transparent.''^ This point 
makes meaning into an undecidable question. But meaning is 
nevertheless a moment with which we cannot dispense.'^" Meaning can 
be glimpsed in the very structure of subjectivity. If the subject is the 
gap between the Symbolic and the Real or between the moral and the 
pathological, then Kantian autonomy is a constituent'^' element of the 
'^5 See Schroeder, Midas Touch, supra note 128, at 762 ("This temporary quilting of 
signification into meaning, which requires a willful forgetting of the shifting contingency of 
signification, is necessary for speech."). 
176 Cf. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 13-14 (Mary 
Gregor trans., 1998) ("Now, an action from duty is to put aside entirely the influence of 
inclination and with it every object of the will; hence there is left from the will nothing that could 
determine it except... the law. ..."). 
177 ZI2EK. ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL FACTOR, supra note 19, at 215. 
178 This is with the proviso that the superego demands contradictory things. It says both 
"erase yourself and "enjoy yourself." 
179 See ZIZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 365 ("[W]e never know if the determinate 
content that accounts for the specificity of our acts is the right one, that is, if we have actually 
acted in accordance with the Law and have not been guided by some hidden pathological 
motives."). 
180 See Cover, supra note 100, at 15 ("The unification of meaning that stands at its center 
exists only for an instant, and that instant is itself imaginary."). 
•81 "Constitution" is a swear word in Kantian philosophy. I use it here nevertheless, but 1 
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self. It is one of the poles between which the tent of self is pitched. 
One cannot be suspended between the poles if the poles do not exist. 
Meaning is simply the exaltation of the autonomy pole at the total 
expense of the pathological pole. Meaning emerges when the 
interpreter exorcises the pathological and allows only the non-
pathological, "autonomous" side to speak. When this occurs, signifier 
coincides with signified. The signifier thus becomes a sign i.e., a 
successful correlation.'^^ 
Meaning is achieved at the precise moment the subject interprets. 
Interpretation is a Real act. At this moment, the subject is unconscious. 
The polar opposites between which the subject resides have collapsed. 
The subject contracts infinitely, and the symbolic order expands 
accordingly: 
The Word is a contraction in the guise of its very opposite, of an 
expansion-, that is, in pronouncing a word, the subject contracts his 
being outside himself, he "coagulates" the core of his being in an 
external sign. In the (verbal) sign I find myself outside myself. . . . 
In this oracular moment, when the subject goes blank, interpretation 
becomes meaning. Alas, it is only a moment a glimpse, ajouissance. 
The aet of interpretation is a traumatic event beyond the symbolic realm 
which, in the end, cannot bear the phenomenon of "meaning." 
The unity that acts—^which pole is it? Do we have corrupt, 
pathological interpretation, driven by selfish concerns? Or do we have 
an aphanisis—the genuine vanishing mediator that allows the thing to 
speak for itself?jhis we must always interpret for ourselves. The 
key point is: interpretation rightly claims a ground of reason. Reason 
can never be entirely purged by pathology. But, likewise, the obverse is 
true: reason can never entirely purge pathology. 
It is this last point that justifies this Article's conservative 
credentials. Because meaning is "necessary," the rule of law is 
vindicated from the assault by the romantic Utopian left. Granted, we 
never know completely whether the interpretation is the object s true 
meaning. But at least we know that the interpretation logically captures 
believe that the moral side of personality helps to "constitute" the subject. Yet because we can 
never experience this side directly, we can only postulate its existence. This postulation therefore 
"regulates" our empirical inquiry into the constitution of the subject. See CRITIQUE OF PURE 
REASON, supra note 9, at 287-88. 
182 On sign versus signifier, see KATHLEEN DOW MAGNUS, HEGEL AND THE SYMBOLIC 
MEDIATION OF SPIRIT 13-52 (2001). 
183 ZIIVK, ABYSS OF FREEDOM, supra note 26, at 38. 
184 See LAGAN, supra note 4, at 210; ZI2EK, PLAGUE OF FANTASIES, supra note 32, at 175 
(defining aphanisis as the self-erasure of the subject when she approaches her fantasy too 
closely). , 
185 See KANT, supra note 176, at 19 ("[W]e can never, even by the most stenuous selt-
examination, get entirely behind our covert incentives . . . ."); id. at 56 ("[Tjhe human being 
cannot claim to cognize what he is in himself through the cognizance he has by inner sensation. ). 
2003] THE TRA UMA TIC DIMENSION IN LA W 2321 
something from the object—some part of its meaning. 
To summarize our findings of fact about the cause of action, the 
cause can only be pleaded (symbolized) after the act. There must be a 
case or controversy before we are admitted to the court of the big Other. 
What we, in our narrative mode, describe as cause is actually a 
performance. We are not merely describing the cause but also creating 
it as we describe it. The real substance of the cause we describe in our 
narrative is a non-Thing—the objetpetit It is the thing that would 
render us whole. The subject of desire acts in pursuit of wholeness, 
which it glimpses in every act. Hence, the act is caused by the objet 
petit a. The act never entirely precedes cause. Indeed, cause is just as 
much in the Real as is its effect. They "coincide" in the real and are 
therefore synchronous. Only retroactively do we distinguish between 
cause and effect, separating them temporally. Hence, cause is the act 
itself. Yet every attempt to articulate the cause is itself an effect, whose 
cause must be narrated. This is the chain of cause-and-effect—the third 
of Kant's four antinomies.'^'' The chain exists only in the symbolic 
order. As such, each cause and effect must be plucked from the realm 
of the Real and must be given body in words. Shakespeare, as always, 
puts it nicely: 
Lovers and madmen have such seething brains. 
Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend 
More than cool reason ever comprehends. 
The lunatic, the lover, and the poet 
Are of imagination all compact:— 
The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling. 
Doth glance from heaven and earth, from earth to heaven 
And, as imagination bodies forth 
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen 
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing 
A local habitation and a name. 
Such tricks hath strong imagination. 
That, if it would but apprehend some joy. 
It comprehends some bringer of that joy; 
Or in the night, imagining some fear. 
How easy is a bush supposed a bear! 
Interpreters of acts are truly madmen with seething brains who 
apprehend more than cool reason can comprehend. Causes and reasons 
' 86 See ZIZEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE, supra note 41, at 31. 
'87 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 9, at 253-56 (stating either every cause is itself 
caused or the chain of causes is caused by an uncaused free thing). 
'88 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A MIDSUMMERNIGHT'S DREAM act 5, § I. 
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are the product of poets' pens, who give names to airy nothing.They 
"comprehend" their earlier enjoyment and therefore apprehend that 
"bringer"—retroactively posited cause. 
Yet the poet's words never "signify." The place of the signified 
can only be filled with other signifiers, dooming us to a never-ending 
chain of cause-and-effect. A cosmological'^' move is needed to totalize 
the chain. Cosmological solutions exceed the realm of reason, Kant 
teaches.'^2 xhis "uncaused" thing is precisely the "totalizing" human 
subject in her freedom. 
I'f. 
I LEGAL OPINION 
ii.' 
! We are now in a position to complete our thesis quickly and 
i efficiently. In law, a judge "acts" and then writes an opinion after the 
fact. The act is unthinking. The judicial opinion is a narration of the 
1; act. In the judicial decision, we learn that pre-existing law caused the 
judicial act. 
i In this pose, the judge is an oracle. She goes blank and acts. In the 
• real, where the act resides, the act has a synchronous unity with its 
i: cause. At this moment, the judge has erased her subjectivity. Her act is 
legal precisely because she renounced her freedom and simply repeated 
what law demands. Nothing original inheres in the judicial act. The 
judge has had what Kant would call an "intellectual intution."'^^ 
Upon awaking from her trance, the judge in her judicial opinion 
n:!?: 
; 1 8 9  cf. FINK, supra note 1, at 41 ("a signifier marks the cancellation of what it signifies"), 
lii;; 190 On the distinction between the madman's apprehension and the subsequent comprehensive 
narrative, Ziiek suggests that comprehension is retained apprehension over time. 
[T]ime itself and the transcendental imagination in its synthetic activity of auto-
affection are not directly the same, since [transcendental imagination] already exerts a 
violence on the pure temporal dispersal—without this violence, reality itself would not 
retain its minimal ontological consistency. Transcendental schematism thus designates 
the procedure by which, already at the level of pre-discursive, purely intuitive temporal 
experience, the pure pre-synthetic temporal dispersal is violently subordinated to the 
synthetic activity of the subject, whose defmitive form is the application of the 
discursive categories of Understanding to intuition. Schematism forges our temporal 
experience into a homogeneous linear succession in which past and future are 
subordinated to the present (which retains the past and announces the future): what 
transcendental schematism prevents us from thinking is precisely the paradox of 
creatio ex nihilo. 
ZI^EK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 43. 
191 A cosmological solution is a principle of totality of a series of conditions or properties, as 
existing in itself and given in an object. See CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 9, at 231, 
288. 
192 See id. at 238 (stating cosmological ideas are directed solely to the unconditioned among 
phenomena); id. at 288 (maintaining cosmological propositions said to be "constitutive"); id. at 
300 (asserting cosmological freedom is not subordinated to another cause determining it in time). 
193 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 9, at 163-64. 
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explains the mystery of her act to us. In this opinion can be found the 
past, present, and foture of law. (1) Law preceded the act. For this 
reason, the judge's opinion is objectively correct. (2) Law was present 
in the act. The judge acted as transparent vanishing mediator of the law. 
Through the judge, it was the law, not the judge, who acted. (3) Law 
arrives too late—after the act. The judge described the act in her after-
the-fact narrative of what happened. By then, law has vanished, 
shattered by the trauma of judicial decision. 
In writing her opinion, the judge armounces that her decision was 
caused by the law. But this is only half-true. Judicial decision is 
traumatic. It disrupts the prior law. The subsequent judicial opinion 
ostensibly "reports" the cause of action, but it actually always 
reconstitutes it.'®'* Instead of simply applying a universal rule in a 
unique concrete situation, the judge re-invents the universal rule in light 
of each unique concrete situation. 
The need to reconstitute the symbolic order after the trauma of a 
judicial decision is the inescapable truth of jurisprudence. A judicial act 
always exceeds the superegoic law and, therefore, must always be 
reversed on appeal. The judicial opinion, however, attempts to legislate 
away grounds for appeal by reconstituting the operative law in order to 
create the appearance that the judicial act accorded with the law. 
This attempt to evade appeal by rewriting the law after the fact 
must always fail. If the losing side appeals, the appellate division of the 
superegoic court is bound to find that the judge has "acted"—i.e., 
disrupted the pre-existing symbolic order. Needless to say, superegoic 
appellate procedure has but one result: "reversed!" Nor does the appeal 
end the matter. The judicial acts of both the trial comt and the appellate 
panel are both constantly and repetitively appealed "as of right"'®^ to the 
Supreme Court of the big Other. The common law process at work in 
the big Other ultimately explains (symbolizes) the prior actions. The 
symbolic order is constantly reworked to account for and to legalize (or 
perhaps condemn) the earlier judicial acts.'®^ 
Against this background, it is possible to understand precisely what 
justice is. Justice is the missing part whose absence makes us feel 
castrated. It is the objet petit a. As such it is entirely negative. True, 
'9" See ZIZEK, ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL FACTOR, supra note 19, at 215. 
"5 See ZI2EK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 365. 
196 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5301 (2002). In the court of the big Other, appeals always involve 
constitutional questions and are therefore "as of right" and never merely "by permission." N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 5302. 
191 For this reason, Pierre Schlag is wrong in his excoriations of legal scholarship as useless, 
"pretend" law. See. e.g., PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM, 
AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND 138 (1996). Judges are not "in charge" of the common law. 
Culture is. To be sure, judges are especially efficacious in shaping its content, but legal scholars 
participate as well. Surely, many examples could be found in which the pressure of public 
opinion has led to changes in the common law. 
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we turn the wrongs against us to shapes, and give to airy justice a local 
habitation and a name. But these embodied examples of justice always 
exceed and therefore fail to capture the object of justice. No legal 
victory would make us whole. Castration is our fate. Justice is 
impossible to achieve. 
This is the lesson Portia tries to teach Shylock in The Merchant of 
Venice. Shylock demands justice from the "strict court of Venice," but 
the court refuses to give it. It renders only twice blessed mercy. Its 
mode of doing so is by reformulating the symbolic order, so that, if 
Shylock may feed his revenge with a pound of flesh, he may not shed a 
drop of blood in obtaining it. This "surprise" content of the law is 
revealed only retroactively to redeem Antonio from superegoic law, 
before which he was obviously guilty. 
Because justice is not a positive thing but the mere absence of the 
Thing, justice is quite opaque to general definition. Any definition of 
justice occurs only by use of signifiers, yet justice is quite is beyond 
signification. So conceived, justice must always fail.'®^ As Renata 
Salecl puts it: 
In terms of Lacanian psychoanalysis, the difference between law 
and justice is that between symbolic knowledge and act as Real. 
Justice is a decision, an act of judgement, which cannot be wholly 
founded in law. The judge must rest his judgement on the 
knowledge of law, yet the act of just decision is never a result of a 
simple application of the law—there is always a moment of 
singularity and contingency which clings to the act. The gap 
separating justice from law is thus unbridgeable: justice is done with 
reference to the domain of law, yet in its exercise it transgresses it.^oo 
In this account, justice is unspeakable and quite beyond any known 
legal precinct—even a transgression against law. The only justice the 
law permits is the purely negative form of it. Any attempt to provide 
content to the name "justice" is strictly prohibited. One might say that 
law prohibits justice in its impossibility. Justice is in the quantum state 
between the symbolic concepts of right and wrong. It can never be 
quite captured by or reduced to legal concepts. Justice can exist only in 
the lawless interstices between these concepts. 
The internal gaps within communication—Derridean arche-
writing—^prevent language from being a closed system. Meaning 
See ZI2EK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 233 ("[T]he moment a political movement 
pretends fiilly to realize Justice, to translate it into an actual state of things, to pass from the 
spectral democratie a venir to 'actual democracy,' we are in totalitarian catastrophe—in Kantian 
terms, the Sublime changes into the Monstrous."). 
199 See Derrida, supra note 99, at 24-29; Stephen M. Feldman, TTie Politics of Postmodern 
Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 166, 195 (1996); Schroeder, Eumenides, supra note 89; ZLZEK, 
METASTASES OF ENJOYMENT, supra note 72, at 196-97. 
290 SALECL, supra note 132, at 91. 
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implies a closed system, yet, in a closed system, all meaning, 
paradoxically, would disappear. According to Zizek: 
What circulates between subjects in symbolic communication is of 
course ultimately the lack, absence itself, and it is this absence that 
opens the space for "positive" meaning to constitute itself. But all 
these are paradoxes immanent to the field of communication qua 
meaning: the very signifier of nonsense, the "signifier without 
signified," is the condition of the possibility of the meaning of all the 
other signifiers, i.e., we must never forget that the "nonsense" with 
which we are here concemed is strictly intemal to the field of 
meaning, that it "tmncates" it from within.^oi 
In this sense, the Real is the limit within Law itself that prevents law 
from abolishing (or achieving) justice. Justice, as this void, participates 
the "ethics of the Real," which is 
the moral Law in its impenetrable aspect, as an agency that arouses 
anxiety by addressing me with the empty, tautological and, for that 
very reason, enigmatic injunction "Do your duty!", leaving it to me 
to translate this injunction into a determinate moral obligation—I, 
the moral subject, remain forever plagued by uncertainty, since the 
moral Law provides no guarantee that I "got it right". . . 
This gap "between knowledge and decision, between the chain of 
reasons and the act which resolves the dilemma," is the "ultimate 
deadlock" of modem times.^o^ This gap implies that doing justice is 
always an act of "sublimation:"—in sublimation, the judge elevates a 
(non)-object to the dignity of the Thing. 
The judge always practices the "ethics of the Real," and this means 
there is something paradoxical about the act of judging. The judge 
erases herself so that law can speak through her without subjective 
distortion. In erasure, the judge submits to law. But law likewise 
requires subjectivity in general. Otherwise, law can never appear, and 
can never condemn anything. Therefore, self-erasure is impossible and. 
201 ZI2EK, LOOKING AWRY, supra note 30, at 131-32 (footnotes omitted). 
202 ZI2EK, INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER, supra note 30, at 168-69. See CRITIQUE OF PURE 
REASON, supra note 9, at 310: 
The real morality of actions—their merit or demerit, and even that of our own conduct, 
is completely unknown to us. Our estimates can relate only to their empirical 
character. How much is the result of the action of free-will, how much is to be 
ascribed to nature and to blameless error, or to a happy constitution of temperament... 
no one can discover, nor, for this reason, determine with perfect justice. 
Id. See also ZIZEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE, supra note 41, at 70 (describing how the 
Kantian subject is "forever tortured by the possibility that his ethical act, although in accordance 
with duty, was not accomplished for the sake of duty itself.. ."); ZIZEK, PLAGUE OF FANTASIES, 
supra note 32, at 221 (stating that the ethical subject is the only guarantor of the universality of 
positive moral norms). "Anxiety" is defined as getting too close to the Real. See ZLZEK, 
LOOKING AWRY, supra note 30, at 8, 146. Hence, any call of the moral is by definition ridden 
with anxiety. 
203 ZIZEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 337. 
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furthermore, prohibited. It is beyond law. Yet it is covertly required. 
Furthermore, when the judge acts, the erasure is paradoxical. The 
erased will of the judge is not erased but has positive (extra-legal) 
content. Here we have the crucial Hegelian point that the erased 
nothing is, after all, something.^o^ This extra-legal excess of self-
erasure is the "Freudian death drive," and it describes the ultimate moral 
act.205 In the moral act, the symbolic order is suspended and the judge 
is on her own. Hence, morality is strictly illegal. Yet it is only through 
the judge's moral illegality that law can ever appear in its undistorted 
form. 
The judge's dilemma is this. She knows there is  a law. But she 
never knows what the law is. A gap separates the law fi-om its positive 
incarnations. The judge is thus a priori, in her very existence, guilty: 
guilty without knowing what she is guilty of, infringing the law without 
knowing its exact regulations.^o^ A judge who acts cannot blame the 
law as her reason but must take total responsibility for what she does.^®'' 
This is law's traumatic dimension. 
GRAPHING LEGAL REASON 
Before concluding, I would like to borrow from one of Lacan's 
graphic illustrations of the retroactivity of interpretation.^"^ 
204 See SCIENCE OF LOGIC, supra note 22, at 119: 
Something preserves itself in the negative of its determinate being [Nichtdasein]-, it is 
essentially one with it and essentially not one with it. It stands ... in a relation to its 
otherness .... The otherness is at once contained in it and also still separate from it; it 
is being-for-other. 
See id. at 102 (asserting "but a negative nothing is an affirmative something"). 
205 ZI2EK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 263. See generally Schroeder & Carlson, 
supra note 61. 
206 See ZI2EK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 24, at 265; COPJEC, READ MY DESIRE, supra 
note 5, at xv ("Guilt, our sure sense that we have transgressed the law, is the only phenomenal 
form in which the law makes itself known to us."). 
207 Robert Cover reaches a like conclusion but on much different grounds. For Cover, there is 
no one law. There are many laws. When the judge asserts American positive law, the judge must 
take responsibility. Nevertheless, when the judge is within the cormmmity of the litigants. Cover 
implies that the judge can claim to be following the law, contrary to what has been said here. See 
Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). 
208 This graph is described in Mladen Dolar, The Object Voice, in SIC 1: GAZE AND VOICE AS 
LOVE OBJECTS 7 (Renata Salecl & Slavoj ZiJek eds. 1996); 2I2EK, SUBLIME OBJECT, supra note 
27, at 101-29. 
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In this graph, time flows from left to right, but legal reasoning 
proceeds backward. We start with the judge who "acts" by deciding. 
The judicial  act  proceeds upward and encounters the big Other (A).  
This node is a totality, representing the fact that, in the act, the judge is 
oblivious and unconscious as she stands over against the correlative 
law. The judge has erased herself and, in her transparency, encounters 
the realm of right answers. 
From this first node, the judge proceeds backwards to the bottom 
left node—the node of the signified (s(A)). What this represents is a 
traversing of the symbolic order. In effect, the judge, in her trance 
listens to legal argument from the litigants. What hits the judge is a 
stream of syllables—nonsensical syllables, until the argument is 
finished. When finished, the judge "understands" the argument. What 
seemed at the start of the argument as nonsense syllables now 
retroactively makes sense. The syllables were simply parts of a 
sentence that made no sense until the sentence was completed. Once 
completed, the syllables retroactively "signified" some legal object. 
Because a "signified" can exist only in a correlative universe, and 
because correlation is the hallmark of fantasy, we can say that 
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signification is dominated by the fantasy of right answers.^^^ 
Having now understood the argument, the judge, in her erasure, 
produces the right answer in her judicial opinion. This is how legal 
reasoning works at the Dworkinian level—the level at which judges do 
not suffer from the distortions of the unconscious. 
But psychoanalysis adds an "illocutionary" aspect to judging, 
which is shown in the upper half of the graph. At the bottom right node, 
the judge, in her erasure, proceeds to the bottom left node of s(A). But, 
instead of proceeding from A to s(A), the judge's retroactive reasoning 
process is portrayed as a Lacanian act. Entering the realm of 
illocutionary force, the judge's act proceeds to the third node of drive 
(3<>Z)). The 3 oxavba for the Lacanian split subject. This is the 
subject who knows she is castrated and can never be whole. 
Nevertheless, she strives for wholeness anyway. She "acts," knowing 
the act will be futile. This is the subject caught up in the death drive. 
Driven to judge, she proceeds retroactively to the upper right node 
of s(%)—^the "barred Autre." It is here that the thrust of this essay can 
be loeated. In effect, the judge is driven to act. In the jouissance of 
acting, the symbolic order is obliterated, producing the barred Autre or 
Other. The barred Other on the upper left is the truth of the bottom left 
node of the signified. In it, we see that the big Other (like the subject) is 
organized around a kernel of the Real which can never be symbolized— 
a trauma.210 Hence, while the judge produces "right answers" in the 
lower half of the graph, the judge obliterates the very possibility of right 
answers in the unconscious upper portion of the graph. 
Not only does the judge's jouissance disrupt the big Other, but the 
big Other likewise disrupts the judge's jouissance. Jouissance does not 
pass through the symbolic order unaffected. The act is a failure. It ends 
with castration. The judge in her act has not succeeded in capturing 
justice {object petit a). Nevertheless, at the end of the process we have 
a judicial opinion that purports to be the law but appears so only in a 
retroactive process that secretly rewrites the law. It is the judge who, in 
her act, made up the first node (the big Other). This big Other is 
reconstituted in the very aet of the judge. 
CONCLUSION 
The difficulty that American jurisprudence cannot solve is that law 
and liberty are ostensibly at war.^n In Shakespearean terms, "Liberty 
209 See ZLZEK, SUBLIME OBJECT, supra note 27, at 123. 
210 See id. at 122. 
211 As Pierre Schlag emphasizes. See PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 11, 
138 (1998). 
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plucks justice by the nose."^'^ In psychoanalytic theory, they are 
reconciled. With every free act, the law is traumatized. After-the-fact 
narration solves the trauma and changes the law. Because the law is 
dynamic and is the product of interpretation, the subject is both free and 
ruled by law. Law is not brittle but, like a reed, bends with the wind. 
But this is so only when law is spoken in the future anterior tense. As 
such, it is the solution to the traumatic dimension in law. 
212 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 1, § 3. 
